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Non-technical summary 
 
There is no significant doubt among economists that competition policy has 
established itself in most industrialised countries as an integral part of public 
policy that contributes substantially to the improvement of the wealth of nations. 
However, the follow-up question of how substantial these benefits of competition 
policy have been (compared to the costs), has not yet attracted huge research input 
by economists. This “state of the art” is unfortunate as, for instance, competition 
authorities have to justify their budgets (or requests for budget increases) and 
might find it helpful to show the significance of their work. Furthermore, 
economists also benefit from showing to what extent society benefits from their 
public policy recommendations.  
  
Against this background, the paper aims at assessing the costs and benefits of 
antitrust enforcement. The analysis starts with an investigation of why competition 
is typically worth protecting followed by a collection of empirical evidence which 
shows that competition actually needs protection by antitrust policy in order to 
hinder firms to permanently abuse market power to the detriment of consumers.  
 
Subsequently, an estimation of the costs and benefits of antitrust enforcement is 
undertaken for the United States and the Netherlands. The analysis differentiates 
between an aggregate level approach which basically focuses on deadweight 
losses and a disaggregate level approach which estimates the benefits of antitrust 
enforcement in particular antitrust cases and compares these figures with estimates 
of the costs of antitrust enforcement. The results basically show for the United 
States and the Netherlands that the realised benefits overtop the realised costs by 
far as long as overcharges/redistribution effects and deadweight losses are 
considered as welfare loss. However, if only the avoidance of deadweight losses is 
considered as benefit of antitrust policy, the benefits estimate for cartel and 
merger enforcement under a disaggregate approach cannot cover the derived cost 
estimate for the United States and the Netherlands.  
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Nichttechnische Zusammenfassung 
 
Unter Ökonomen bestehen keine nennenswerten Zweifel darüber, dass sich die 
Wettbewerbspolitik in den meisten industrialisierten Staaten als ein integraler 
Bestandteil der Wirtschaftspolitik etabliert hat der substantiell zum Wohlstand der 
Nationen beiträgt. Die sich unmittelbar anschließende Frage, in welcher Höhe 
dieser Wohlfahrtsbeitrag von Wettbewerbspolitik angesetzt werden kann 
(verglichen mit den entstehenden Kosten) hat bislang noch keinen größeren 
Einsatz von Forschungsressourcen erfahren. Dieser Zustand muss als bedauerlich 
bezeichnet werden, da beispielsweise Wettbewerbsbehörden ihre Budgets (sowie 
auch Forderungen nach Budgeterhöhungen) zu rechtfertigen haben und es im 
Rahmen dessen hilfreich sein kann, den Wohlfahrtsbeitrag ihrer Tätigkeiten 
verdeutlichen zu können. Darüber hinaus können auch die Ökonomen selbst von 
Studien profitieren, die Anhaltspunkte darüber geben, zu welchem Grad die 
Gesellschaft von ihren wirtschaftspolitischen Empfehlungen profitiert oder 
profitieren könnte.   
 
Vor diesem Hintergrund verfolgt das Arbeitspapier das Ziel, die Kosten und den 
Nutzen der Durchsetzung von Wettbewerbsrecht abzuschätzen. Die Untersuchung 
startet mit einer Behandlung der Fragestellung, weshalb Wettbewerb 
typischerweise schützenswert ist, gefolgt von einer Sammlung von empirischen 
Indizien, die untermauern, dass Wettbewerb des Schutzes durch 
Wettbewerbspolitik bedarf um Unternehmen daran zu hindern, ihre Marktmacht 
dauerhaft auf Kosten der Konsumenten zu missbrauchen.   
 
Im Anschluss daran wird eine Abschätzung der konkreten Kosten und Nutzen der 
Durchsetzung von Wettbewerbsrecht versucht und zwar sowohl für die 
Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika als auch für die Niederlande. Die Untersuchung 
unterscheidet zwischen einem aggregierten Niveau, das sich im Wesentlichen auf 
die Abschätzung der Netto-Wohlfahrtsverluste (der sogenannten ‚deadweight 
losses’) konzentriert und einem disaggregierten Niveau, das eine Abschätzung der 
Wohlfahrtseffekte abgegrenzter wettbewerbspolitischer Fälle versucht. Beide 
Arten der Abschätzung von  Wohlfahrtseffekten werden in Beziehung gesetzt zu 
einer Abschätzung der durch Wettbewerbspolitik entstehenden Kosten in den 
beiden Ländern. Die Ergebnisse zeigen für die Vereinigten Staaten wie auch für 
die Niederlande, dass die realisierten Nutzen die entstehenden Kosten klar 
überragen solange nicht nur die Netto-Wohlfahrtsverluste, sondern auch die 
Umverteilungseffekte Eingang in Quantifizierung finden. Wird der Nutzen von 
Wettbewerbspolitik aber lediglich in der Reduzierung der Netto-
Wohlfahrtsverluste gesehen, so zeigen die Ergebnisse, dass der durch die 
Kartellverfolgung und die Fusionskontrolle realisierte Nutzen die entstehenden 
Kosten weder in den Vereinigten Staaten noch in den Niederlanden decken kann.    
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1 Introduction 
 
Among the few things most economists would agree on is the social desirability of 
competition. Given the extensive theoretical and empirical economic research that 
has been able to prove a positive, strong and stable relationship between the 
degree of competition in a market, an industry or an economy and the 
correspondingly realised degrees of allocative, productive, transactional and 
dynamic efficiency, it is extremely difficult to find convincing arguments for 
alternative views. However, the finding that competition is typically worth 
protecting is only a necessary but not sufficient condition to justify a need for 
some kind of antitrust policy. And indeed, different schools of thought came to 
quite different answers with respect to the question if protection - and what kind of 
protection of competition - is needed. The spectrum reaches from laissez-faire 
approaches with no or only skeletal antitrust rules up to quite interfering 
approaches which plan to create an optimal competition intensity. 
Antitrust policy, as opposed to regulation, is applied in markets in which the 
competitive process is in principle viable, and only occasionally endangered by 
actions of individual firms or groups of firms. Therefore, in the words of Geroski 
(2004: 4), antitrust policy only “… swings into operation when serious, egregious 
problems are believed to exist”. Although most economists would probably still 
agree on the desirability of these ‘selective and episodic swings’ in an artificial 
world of perfect information, a considerable group of scholars becomes sceptical 
about how to decide ‘when to swing’ as well as ‘the accuracy of the swings’ in a 
world of imperfect and incomplete information in which the antitrust authority has 
to judge on complex forms of business behaviour in complex markets with a 
multitude of knock-on effects. Especially in such environments, it is believed that 
market forces (at least in the long run) will ‘automatically’ select the most 
efficient firms and lead to efficient market outcomes. Antitrust interventions, on 
the other hand, are believed to do more harm than good, especially because “… 
economists … have not reached a consensus about the ultimate effects of various 
business practices ... [I]t seems likely that well-intentioned prosecutors and judges 
face .. some difficulty in distinguishing good from bad business practices” 
(Bittlingmayer, 1996: 371). 
Against this background, the paper aims at assessing the costs and benefits of 
antitrust enforcement. The analysis starts with an investigation of why competition 
is typically worth protecting followed by a collection of empirical evidence which 
shows that competition actually needs protection by antitrust policy in order to 
hinder firms to permanently abuse market power to the detriment of consumers. 
Subsequently, an estimation of the costs and benefits of antitrust enforcement is 
undertaken for the United States and the Netherlands. The analysis differentiates 
between an aggregate level approach which basically focuses on deadweight 
losses (for industries or even economies) and a disaggregate level approach which 
estimates the benefits of antitrust enforcement in particular antitrust cases and 
compares these figures with estimates of the costs of antitrust enforcement. In 
particular, the lysine cartel case in the United States and the Nuon-Reliant merger 
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case in the Netherlands are taken to estimate these disaggregated benefits of 
antitrust enforcement. While the former case allows an estimation of the 
aggregated benefits via so-called ‘but-for’ prices, the later case uses merger 
simulation results to derive reasonable estimates of the post-merger prices that 
would have existed absent of the remedies which were imposed. The paper 
concludes with a roundup of the key empirical results.  
2 Competition is worth protecting 
Economists and philosophers have both studied competition and the benefits of 
competition in a multitude of ways. Notwithstanding the potential relevance of 
any of these efforts - some of which having been very influential, such as Adam 
Smith’s “invisible hand” or Friedrich August von Hayek’s “competition as a 
discovery procedure” - the most fundamental result of all these research efforts is 
probably the insight that competitive markets allocate resources efficiently 
because they provide products to all customers willing to pay the opportunity cost 
of production (see, for example, Debreu, 1959).  
Market power is generally defined as deviation from this competitive 
benchmark. If a company can profitably raise and maintain a price above its 
marginal cost (i.e., the market price under perfect competition), then it possesses 
some degree of market power. The degree of market power is maximised in a 
monopoly, as the company can set the profit-maximising market price absent of 
other firms. 1  Although both monopoly and perfect competition are typically 
artificial constructs, a comparison of both extremes is a fruitful way to derive an 
upper bound for the benefits of competition.  
From a static perspective, the presence of monopoly leads to a welfare loss that 
results from the absence of customers who derive a value that is lower than the 
price of the product but greater than the marginal cost of production (see Chart 1a 
in Fig. 1 below). The size of the welfare loss can be expressed as a function of the 
price-cost margin, industry revenue (a measure for market size) and the industry 
elasticity of demand: 
D
MRMDWL  2
2
1
. (1) 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1  Although monopolists do not face constraints of direct competitors in their price-
quantity decision, they cannot act independently. They maximise profits subject to 
demand conditions. 
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Fig. 1. Inefficiencies caused by the exercise of market power 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1) ALLOCATIVE INEFFICIENCY 
a) Welfare loss of monopoly (DWL) 
b) Welfare loss due to rent-seeking activities (RSA) 
λ = Dissipation ratio, λ=1 in the graph 
2) PRODUCTIVE INEFFICIENCY (PI) 
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Harberger (1954) undertook one of the first attempts to estimate the deadweight 
loss for 73 US manufacturing industries from 1924 to 1928. His estimations, based 
on Equation (1) above, led to a monopoly welfare loss of around 0,1%2 of the 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Surprised by this (seemingly) small size of the 
welfare loss, Harberger concluded that “we can neglect monopoly elements and 
still gain a very good understanding of how our economic process works” 
(Harberger, 1954: 87). In response to Harberger’s analysis and conclusion, 
economists undertook numerous attempts to recalculate the welfare triangle loss 
by replacing some of his oversimplifying assumptions and/or using different data 
sets (see, for example, Schwartzman, 1960; Kamerschen, 1960). Furthermore, 
scholars increasingly investigated the follow-up question, “If the conventional loss 
is so small, are there other, more significant losses?” (Farrell, 1983: 1).   
One possible additional loss of monopoly was traced out by Tullock (1967). He 
pointed out that if firms compete to gain and to preserve market power, these 
resources diverted to unproductive activities must be added to the welfare loss of 
monopoly, and the overall loss therefore has the geometrical form of a trapezoid 
rather than a triangle. Referring to Chart 1b) in Figure 1 above, the additional 
welfare loss due to so-called rent-seeking activities is determined by the 
dissipation ratio λ (i.e., the percentage of the total rent dissipated by rent-seeking 
activities), the price-cost margin M and the monopoly revenue RM:3 
  10   withRMRSA M . (2) 
Although rent-seeking expenses are typically viewed as a welfare loss of 
monopoly, Neumann (2000: 107) points out that such a classification of rent-
seeking activities already involves a value judgment. This is because the expenses 
                                                          
2  Please note that in order to comply with the graphs, which were created with German-
language software packages, the comma is used in place of the decimal point (i.e., 
2,0% instead of 2.0%) and the full stop in place of a comma (i.e., 5.000€ instead of 
5,000€). 
3  Tullock (1980) himself studied the determinants of the size of the dissipation ratio. 
He shows in a basic rent-seeking game that the expenditure on rent-seeking κ by each 
of the n individual rent seekers is given by   M2 RMn1n  . This means that if 
the rent to win (i.e., the monopoly profit) is given by 50 and there are 7 firms in the 
contest, each firm will spend about 6,12 in the contest. This would lead to an overall 
investment in the contest of 7*6,12 = 42,84 and a dissipation ratio of (42,84/50) = 
85,7%. Hazlett and Michaels (1993) studied lotteries conducted by the US Federal 
Communications Commission to award cellular telephone licenses. There were 643 
licenses available, and almost everybody was (seemingly) allowed to participate in 
the lottery (i.e., no barriers to entry were initially noticed). In such an environment, 
Hazlett and Michaels would have expected total rent dissipation (as n is large, in fact 
about 320.000). However, their empirical results show that overall costs were $325 
million, while the rents were estimated to about $611 million, leading to an (average) 
dissipation ratio of about 0,53. Hazlett and Michaels explain this result with the 
existence of entry barriers in the application process (such as a factual entry fee of 
nearly $3.500 per application due to general fees and attorney fees). 
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for rent-seeking activities are not lost surplus (as the deadweight loss discussed 
above) but rather income of other individuals and therefore not a loss of total 
welfare. Therefore, the classification of rent-seeking activities as welfare loss is 
dependent on a value judgment that these expenses and the resulting incomes are 
of lower value than other incomes.   
Posner (1975) was one of the first scholars who actually incorporated rent-
seeking into a measure of overall welfare loss due to monopoly power. He studied 
the relative size of the deadweight loss and the resources wasted on competition to 
acquire and maintain monopoly profits and showed that the deadweight loss DWL 
relative to the rent-seeking loss RSA is given by 
 CD
C
U
U
RSA
DWL
 12 , (3) 
with UC=ΔP/PC (price-cost markup). Equation (3) shows that the RSA is large 
relative to the DWL when UC is small. For instance, if εD=1 and the price-cost 
markup is given by 0,2, the loss due to rent-seeking activities is about eight times 
larger than the deadweight loss. Using Harberger’s data as well as his estimate of 
the DWL, Posner estimated that, while the deadweight loss is 0,1% of GDP, rent-
seeking activities account for about 3,3% of GDP, leading to an aggregated 
welfare loss due to monopoly of about 3,4% of GDP for the United States.  
Cowling and Mueller (1978) also extended Harberger’s work by changing 
several assumptions. For instance, instead of using unity elasticity, they applied 
the (inverse) Lerner index (PM/(PM-MC))=ε and showed that the deadweight loss 
is then equal to half of the monopoly profits: 4 
  MMMM QMCPRMDWL 
2
1
2
1
2
1  . (4) 
By using this estimate, Cowling and Mueller avoided using separate estimates 
of the price markup and the demand elasticity (and therefore considered the 
interdependence of the observed price-cost ratios and of the value of the elasticity 
of demand; see, for example, Clarke, 1985: 234). Furthermore, Cowling and 
Mueller also incorporated the cost of reaching and maintaining a monopoly by 
extending their study with several combined measures of deadweight loss and 
advertising expenses (as a measure for rent-seeking activities; see Table 1 below 
for an overview of their measures). Their results show, depending on the used 
measure, aggregated welfare losses ranging from 3,96% to 13,14% for the United 
States and ranging from 3,86% to 7,20% of the Gross Corporate Product (GCP) or 
equivalent for the United Kingdom. An overview of influential studies on 
monopoly welfare losses is presented in Table 1 below.  
Masson and Shaanan (1984) present a methodology for estimating welfare 
losses caused by market power which departs from the studies discussed thus far, 
because they explicitly take different levels of market power into account. The 
authors provide estimates for the actual social costs arising from existing market 
                                                          
4  Cowling and Mueller’s results, however, hold only in the absence of fixed costs.  
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structures as well as the expected monopoly social costs that would occur if there 
were no competition. They define the difference between actual and monopoly 
welfare losses as the value of competition in existing markets. Masson and 
Shaanan find that the actual oligopoly deadweight loss averages 2,9% of the value 
of shipments for a sample of 37 US manufacturing industries from 1950 to 1966. 
Furthermore, they estimate a potential (average) monopoly deadweight loss of 
11,6%, leading to a value of competition of 8,7%.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Monopoly welfare loss estimates 
Study Country Measure Welfare loss Scope Assumptions / Remarks 
STUDIES FOCUSING SOLELY ON DEADWEIGHT LOSS 
Harberger (1954) US 0,5*M2*RM*εD 0,1 2.046 firms in 73 US 
manufacturing industries 
from 1924 to 1928; 
Unity elasticity, competitive rates of 
return given by average rate of 
return in sample 
Schwartzman (1960) US      
CAN 
0,5*(PM-PC)*zπ <0,1 Sample of Canadian and 
US industries in 1954 
Used direct price-cost margins data; 
allowed elasticities up to 2 
Kamerschen (1960) US Similar to Harberger 1,9 US industry from 1956/7 to 
1960/1 
Inclusion of other non-
manufacturing and non-corporate 
sectors 
Worchester (1973) US General equilibrium 
model of welfare loss 
0,43-0,73 Data on 500 largest 
industrial individual firms 
from 1956 to 1969 
Used firm-level instead of industry-
level data 
STUDIES FOCUSING ON DEADWEIGHT LOSS AND RENT-SEEKING EXPENSES 
Posner (1975) US DWL/RSA=          
(UC/(2(1/εD-UC))) 
3,4 Uses Harberger data Assumed that resources committed 
to rent-seeking equal revenues 
obtainable 
Cowling/Mueller (1978) US π/2 3,96 
 US (π+A)/2 6,52 
 US A+(π+A)/2 12,27 
 US π'+A+(π+A)/2 13,14 
734 large US firms from 
1963 to 1969 
Cowling/Mueller (1978) UK π/2 3,86 
 UK (π+A)/2 4,36 
 UK A+(π+A)/2 5,39 
 UK π'+A+(π+A)/2 7,20 
Largest 103 UK firms from 
1968 to 1969 
Used half monopoly profit rather 
than separate estimates for price-cost 
margins and elasticities; used 
independent estimate of the 
competitive rate of return; used 
firm-level monopoly profits; used 
advertising as estimates of rent-
seeking expenditures 
Welfare loss is in % of GNP or equivalent; C&M use gross corporate product; z is arc elasticity of demand; A is advertising; and π and π' are pre- 
and post-tax profits (see Clarke 1985: 235). 
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Davies and Majumdar (2002: 30ff.) express their concern about the general 
value of measuring deadweight losses of monopoly for large parts of economies 
basically due to the oversimplifications which are necessary for such a 
quantification (such as an average demand elasticity and an average price-cost 
margin for large parts of an economy). However, in aiming at showing the 
sensitivity of such models, they adopt the methodology of Cowling and Mueller 
(1978) and apply the well-known relationship in a homogenous Cournot model 
that the price-cost margin equals the Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration index 
divided by the market demand elasticity. Making use of this relationship by 
inserting it into the general deadweight loss formula derived above leads to the 
following estimate for the deadweight loss: 
MRMHHIDWL 
2
1 . (5) 
As Equation (5) shows, the DWL now depends on a measure of market 
concentration, namely the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, which is somehow easier 
to estimate than market demand elasticity (as a lot of countries have statistics at 
least for the major industries). In the following, Davies and Majumdar (2002: 31) 
attempt to calibrate Equation (5) for the UK. For the average price-cost margin, 
they decide to use a value of 0,1 as a defensive estimate, compared to a value of 
0,08 used by Cowling and Mueller and a broader survey by Scherer and Ross 
(1990), which found price-cost margins between 0,1 and 0,2. In terms of HHI, 
they assume a value of 0,1 (in a properly defined market), largely based on rough 
approximations due to the fact that the UK only publishes data on concentration 
ratios.5 Inserting the M and HHI values in Equation (5) leads to an aggregated 
welfare loss of 0,5% of GDP.         
A third kind of possible loss due to monopoly is the loss in productive 
efficiency if a monopoly slacks off and prefers “the quiet life” to profit 
maximisation. As shown in Chart 2) in Figure 1 above, such inefficiencies lead to 
a higher marginal cost level and a corresponding welfare loss given by6  
    ''''
2
1 MMMMMCMM QQPPQPPRMPI  . (6) 
At first glance, it seems implausible why the shareholders of a monopoly firm 
would be less willing to keep costs down (and let slacking happen) than those of a 
competitive firm (see Rasmusen, 2000: pt. VII, no. 33). To the question “Why 
                                                          
5  For the United States, data on the Herfindahl-Hirschman Indices for 443 US 
manufacturing industries (four-digit SIC) for the year 1992 is available (see 
www.census.gov/ epcd/www/concentration.html). The average HHI for the US for 
these industries in 1992 can be calculated to 725,49. 
6  In the same way as explained for the case of rent-seeking activities, a value judgment 
stating that society values the distribution of pecuniary and non-pecuniary rents in a 
quiet-life monopoly state less than the results that competition would bring is needed 
in order to interpret the entire hatched area in Fig. 1-2) as a welfare loss due to 
monopoly (see also Neumann, 2000: 107). 
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would a monopolist spare efforts to reduce costs when it stands to reap all the 
incremental profits arising from the cost reduction (i.e., when it does not have to 
worry about the incremental profits being competed away)?” (Chen and Chen, 
2005: 25), Farrell (1983) provides an intuitive explanation based on the separation 
of ownership and control. In a world of imperfect information, managers find it 
costly to search for better techniques. The firm itself cannot reliably tell when the 
manager is searching, and so cannot reimburse him for these costs. The firm also 
cannot reliably tell by results whether or not the manager has been diligent partly 
due to missing comparator firms. The best the shareholders can do is to provide a 
contract with some incentive to increase profits; however, the manager's risk 
aversion limits the effectiveness of such contracts.7 According to Farrell (1983: 1), 
“[t]he inefficiency which results is ameliorated if more information becomes 
available about the manager's activities; and, if there is a competing firm, the 
market interaction may convey such information” .8 
Empirical evidence on productive inefficiencies is diverse but still fragmentary 
(see Davies and Majumdar, 2002: 35ff.). In probably the most influential paper, 
Nickell (1996) investigates the question whether competition improves corporate 
performance. His results based on an analysis of 670 UK companies largely 
support this view. Nickell finds that market power - captured by market share - 
generates reduced levels of productivity. More importantly, he presents evidence 
that competition is associated with a significantly higher rate of total factor 
productivity growth. Furthermore, a study by Jenny and Weber (1983) derive an 
estimate for productive inefficiencies in France of 5,18% of GDP for the years 
1971 to 1974. Additionally, Ahn (2002: 53ff.) provides an overview of the main 
methods and main findings of further studies on the competition-productivity 
relationship in certain sectors or industries (see especially Bailey, 1993; Baily and 
Gersbach, 1995; Zitzewitz, 2003; Disney et al., 2000). The results mostly show 
that increases in product market competition led to increases in the overall levels 
of productive efficiency. In line with these findings, Scherer and Ross (1990: 672) 
conclude their survey on productive inefficiencies by expressing their belief that 
productive inefficiencies are “at least as large as the welfare losses from resource 
misallocation.”  
An alternative to the study of the general relationships between competition and 
productivity across different product markets is an analysis of recently liberalised 
sectors. In such environments, economic theory would expect significant 
productivity improvements after deregulation due to the inefficiencies typically 
caused by economically largely obsolete regulation schemes (see OFT, 2007). 
                                                          
7  Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983: 281) argue in a comparable way by focusing on 
principal-agent problems and conclude that monopoly does not cause productive 
efficiency losses in an owner-managed firm.  
8  As discussed in more detail in McAfee and McMillan (1996: 263ff.), “revealing 
hidden information” is an important characteristic of competition from a game-
theoretical point of view. Other important characteristics include: “competition works 
better than bargaining”, “competition creates effort incentives” and “competition 
mechanisms are robust”.  
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Certainly, the almost unanimous result of studies by Maher and Wise (2005), 
Ehrlich et al. (1994), Pilat (1996) and Griffith and Harrison (2004) is that 
deregulation in such industries as electricity, gas, water, airlines and road freight 
led to substantial increases in total factor productivity growth. An overview of the 
results of several studies focusing on improvements in productive efficiency (as 
well as consumer welfare) after regulatory reforms in the United States is 
presented in Table 2.  
Table 2. Improvements in productive efficiency and consumer welfare after regulatory 
reforms in the United States 
Industry Studies Improvements in              
productive efficiency 
Improvements in              
consumer welfare  
Airlines Morrison 
and 
Winston 
(1998) 
Average industry load factors 
have increased from roughly 
52% the decade preceding 
deregulation to roughly 62% 
since deregulation. Real costs 
per revenue ton-mile have 
declined at least 25% since 
deregulation. Industry profits 
have been very volatile during 
deregulation, although higher, 
on average, than they would 
have been under regulation. 
Average fares are roughly 33% 
lower in real terms since 
deregulation, and service 
frequency has improved 
significantly. 
Less-than-
truckload 
trucking 
Corsi 
(1996a) 
Carriers have substantially 
reduced their empty miles 
since deregulation. Real 
operating costs per vehicle 
mile have fallen 35%, but 
operating profits are slightly 
lower than they would have 
been under regulation. 
Average rates per vehicle mile 
have declined at least 35% in 
real terms since deregulation, 
and service times have 
improved significantly. 
Truckload 
trucking 
Corsi 
(1996b) 
Carriers have substantially 
reduced their empty miles 
since deregulation. Real 
operating costs per vehicle 
mile have fallen at least 75%, 
but operating profits are 
slightly lower than they would 
have been under regulation. 
Average rates per vehicle mile 
have declined at least 75% in 
real terms since deregulation, 
and, because of the emergence 
of advanced truckload carriers, 
service times have also 
improved significantly. 
Railroads Winston et 
al. (1990) 
Railroads have abandoned one-
third of their track miles since 
deregulation. Real operating 
costs per ton-mile have fallen 
60%, and rail profits are much 
higher than they would have 
been under regulation. 
Average rates per ton mile 
have declined more than 50% 
in real terms since 
deregulation, average transit 
time has fallen at least 20%, 
and the standard deviation of 
transit time has fallen even 
more than 20%. 
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Banking Berger et 
al. (1995) 
The real cost of an electronic 
deposit has fallen 80% since 
deregulation. Operating costs 
have declined 8% in the long 
run because of branch 
deregulation. Recent industry 
returns on equity exceed those 
just before deregulation. 
Consumers have benefited 
from higher interest rates, 
better opportunities to manage 
risk, and more banking offices 
and automated teller machines. 
Natural 
Gas 
Henning et 
al. (1995); 
Costello 
and Duann 
(1996); 
Crandall 
and Ellig 
(1997) 
Pipeline capacity has been 
much more efficiently utilised 
during peak and off-peak 
periods since deregulation. 
Real operating and 
maintenance expenses in 
transmission and distribution 
have fallen roughly 35%. 
Average prices for residential 
customers have declined at 
least 30% in real terms since 
deregulation, and average 
prices for commercial and 
industrial customers have 
declined even more than 30%. 
In addition, service has been 
more reliable as shortages have 
been almost completely 
eliminated. 
Source: Winston (1998) 
In addition to the described efforts to estimate the true welfare losses due to 
monopoly9, some scholars argue that the economic impact of even small welfare 
losses can be substantially larger if other factors are taken into account. Dickson 
(1982), for instance, shows that a small welfare loss in a monopolised market can 
cause multiple damages if the transmission of monopoly distortions though 
successive vertical stages is considered. Neumann (1999) contributes to the 
discussion by adding the intertemporal dimension. He uses a simple growth model 
to estimate the effect of a static welfare loss due to monopoly on the growth rate 
of the GDP and indeed finds that the long-run welfare loss due to monopoly 
typically dwarfs the static loss analysed above.10 Kwoka (2003: 11) remarks that it 
is not the average deadweight loss (derived by an average demand elasticity and 
an average price-cost margin for large parts of an economy) that matters but rather 
its distribution. Losses are greater in several industries where competition does not 
reign, and the deadweight losses can be quite substantial in these industries 
(although relatively low on average).    
Although the analysis thus far has drawn a solely negative picture of monopoly 
with respect to its (static) welfare effects, economic analysis has shown that this is 
not generally the case. Economies of scale, for example, are one prominent reason 
why a monopolistic market structure might occasionally be socially desirable. On 
                                                          
9  The maximum welfare loss due to monopoly is given by    'MCC'M QQPP21  .  
10  In a simplified example, Neumann (2000: 110f.) shows for a fixed interest rate and 
potential growth rate that a static welfare loss of 0,1% (the Harberger estimate) would 
lead to a yearly welfare loss of about 1%. A static welfare loss of 3% (one of the 
Cowling and Mueller estimates) would lead to a long-term welfare loss of about 26% 
per year.  
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the supply side, economies of scale can lead to situations in which a monopoly is 
able to supply the entire market at a lower unit cost than two or more firms. 
Technically, such natural monopolies exist if the demand curve intersects the 
average cost curve in its downward-sloping or subadditive part. On the demand 
side, economies of scale are reflected in the so-called network effects:11 As the 
value of a network for an individual increases with the number of users,12 the 
overall value is maximised in a monopoly network and a fragmentation would 
lead to consumer welfare losses.  
In addition to a discussion of the largely static concepts of allocative and 
productive efficiency, a fundamental benefit of competition is seen in its ability to 
meet customer requirements dynamically and to ensure that old inferior products 
are replaced by superior new products. As stated by Kolasky and Dick (2002:6), 
“Dynamic efficiency arises from market processes that encourage innovation to 
lower costs and develop new and improved products. Whereas allocative and 
productive efficiency can be viewed as static criteria - holding society’s 
technological know-how constant - a more dynamic view of efficiency examines 
the conditions under which technological know-how and the set of feasible 
products optimally can be expanded over time through means such as learning by 
doing, research and development, and entrepreneurial creativity”. 
From such a dynamic point of view, it has been discussed extensively in the 
economic literature whether market power must be seen as an important 
precondition for technical progress and therefore, to a certain extent, as socially 
desirable.13 Notwithstanding the existence of such a trade-off between static and 
dynamic efficiency, the empirical evidence by the majority shows that monopoly 
power is more likely to slow down the pace of innovative activity14 (see, for 
                                                          
11  See Farrell and Klemperer (2006: 58f.) for a discussion as to why network effects are 
not always (positive) externalities. Generally, negative externalities (such as pollution 
caused by a production process) might be another reason to prefer monopoly over 
competition, simply because a monopoly reduces output and therefore reduces the 
negative externality. However, it is likely that an optimally regulated market in such a 
case would reach better performance levels than either monopoly or perfect 
competition.      
12  If there are n people in a network and the value of the network to each of them is 
proportional to the number of other users, then the total value of the network to all the 
users is proportional to n(n-1)=n2-n. For example, a tenfold increase in network size 
leads to a hundredfold increase in its value. This relationship is known as Metcalfe’s 
Law (see Shapiro and Varian, 1999: 184). Given the functional form, it is obvious 
that demand-side economies of scale do not dissipate (as supply-side economies do 
when the market gets large enough).  
13  See Evans and Schmalensee (2001) and Shapiro and Varian (1999) for overviews and 
discussions of implications for business strategy and public policy. 
14  From a theoretical perspective, the relationship between market power and process 
innovations can be characterised by two conflicting effects. The replacement effect 
(Arrow, 1962) speaks for lower innovation incentives for a monopolist compared to a 
competitive industry (under the assumption that the respective firms are in each case 
the only firms who could implement the respective process innovation[s]). The basic 
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example, Weigand, 1996; Audretsch, 1995; Geroski, 1990). However, recent 
discussions on “very innovative industries” with winner-take-all markets suggest 
that although these firms might be dominant in their market, they face the constant 
threat of being replaced by firms seeking to develop better products. Following 
Schumpeter (1942), these monopolists competed vigorously, not necessarily in the 
market but for the market (see Veljanovski, 2006: 119f. as well as Geroski (2003) 
for round-ups). As a consequence, a (temporary) high level of market power in 
such markets might be socially desirable.    
An acknowledgment of the importance of market power in keeping up 
innovation incentives can be seen in the existence of patent systems. As part of 
such a system, the state factually grants temporary monopolies to innovative firms 
in the form of patents. This is seen as a necessary instrument to allow these firms 
to recoup their investments in research and development by avoiding immediate 
imitation by rivals. A patent system is therefore a necessary public policy 
instrument to keep up the innovation incentives for firms and therefore ensure 
technological progress and economic development. 
In addition to allocative, productive and (possibly) dynamic inefficiencies15, the 
distributional effects of market power might be another reason to prefer 
competition over monopoly. As prices above marginal costs not only lead to net 
losses in overall welfare but also to a (total welfare-neutral) transfer of consumer 
surplus into producer surplus, market power also influences the process of wealth 
creation as well as the distribution of wealth in a society. Comanor and Smiley 
(1975) investigate the impact of enterprise monopoly profits on the distribution of 
household wealth in the United States between 1890 and 1962. They basically find 
that past and current monopoly has had a major impact on the current degree of 
inequality in the distribution of wealth. Creedy and Dixon (1998) estimated the 
relative burden of monopoly, measured as the static loss of consumer surplus for 
different household income levels, and find that the welfare loss associated with 
monopoly power is higher for low-income households compared with high-
                                                                                                                                     
reason for the lower incentives of the monopolist is that by being innovative he is just 
replacing an already high (monopoly) revenue stream with a revenue stream that 
iseven a bit higher. The competitive firm, on the other hand, starts from a situation of 
zero profits and therefore has higher incentives to implement the process innovations. 
If it is, however, assumed that both the monopolist and a potential rival are able to 
implement a certain process innovation, the efficiency effect shows that a monopolist 
now has a higher incentive to be innovative than his rival from the competitive 
industry, because he is in danger of losing his high monopoly excess profits in case 
the rival firm implements the process innovation (Schumpeter, 1942).  
15  A fourth efficiency type which might be distorted by the presence of market power is 
the transactional efficiency. “The basic insight offered by the school of thought 
known as ‘transaction cost economics’ is that market participants design business 
practices, contracts, and organisational forms to minimise transaction costs and, in 
particular, to mitigate information costs and reduce their exposure to opportunistic 
behavior or ‘hold-ups’ … transactional efficiencies frequently facilitate firms’ efforts 
to achieve allocative, productive, and dynamic efficiencies” (Kolasky and Dick, 
2003: 249).   
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income households. However, as Martin (1994: 38) has pointed out, the decision 
whether this is considered a problem from a social point of view is a matter of 
politics rather than economics.  
In a nutshell, this section has characterised several important economic 
arguments why monopolies are typically inferior to competition from a total 
welfare point of view. Although the striving for a monopoly position remains 
probably the most important individual motivation for undertaking business 
activities16 , the permanent (ab)use of such a position likely leads to welfare-
reducing inefficiencies. Although empirical studies on deadweight and rent-
seeking losses show that the performance differential between perfect competition 
and monopoly can be surprisingly small, a closer interpretation of these results 
show that the true losses are very likely significantly larger. Therefore, economists 
might still serve a more useful purpose in fighting monopolies instead of fires or 
termites. 17   
3 Competition needs protection 
The finding that competition is typically worth protecting is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition to justify a need for some kind of competition policy. 
Although the desirability of competition is probably one of the few things most 
economists generally agree upon, different schools of thought arrive at quite 
different answers to the questions of whether protection is needed and what kind 
of protection is needed. The spectrum reaches from laissez-faire approaches with 
no or only skeletal antitrust rules to quite interfering approaches, which plan to 
create an “optimal competition intensity”.   
Without wanting to enter into these debates in detail (see, for example, Kovacic 
and Shapiro, 2000; Mueller, 1996; and van den Berg and Camesasca, 2001, for 
overviews of the US and the EU antitrust policy history), the basic theoretical 
justification for some kind of antitrust policy is its potential to reduce the so-called 
deadweight welfare loss of market power and, consequently, to realise better 
market performances than without such a policy. If the aim of antitrust policy is 
simply to promote economic efficiency, then the additional allocative inefficiency 
caused by productive inefficiencies (trapezoid ABCD in Fig. 1-2 above) must be 
                                                          
16  The importance of (temporary) market power as a key element in market systems is 
expressed in great clarity by Justice Antonin Scalia in the US Supreme Court’s 
Trinko (2004) decision: “The mere possession of monopoly power, and the 
concomitant charging of monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important 
element of the free-market system. The opportunity to charge monopoly prices at 
least for a short period is what attracts business acumen in the first place; it induces 
risk taking that produces innovation and economic growth. To safeguard the incentive 
to innovate, the possession of monopoly power will not be found unlawful unless it is 
accompanied by an element of anticompetitive conduct” (Verizon Communications v. 
Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko LLP, 540 U.S. 398, U.S., 2004). 
17  The original quote stems from George Stigler (1966).  
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added to the deadweight loss to trace out the overall potential of antitrust policy to 
improve total welfare. The inclusion of rent-seeking activities and the fraction of 
productive inefficiencies without allocative distortions is only feasible if the 
underlying aims of competition policy are changed (for example, by adopting a 
consumer surplus standard) or extended (for example, by including the aim of 
promoting a fair income distribution).18  
Antitrust policy, as opposed to regulation, is applied in markets in which the 
competitive process is in principle viable, and only occasionally endangered by 
actions of individual firms or groups of firms. Therefore, in the words of Geroski 
(2004: 4), competition policy only “swings into operation when serious, egregious 
problems are believed to exist”. Although most economists would probably still 
agree on the desirability of these selective and episodic swings in an artificial 
world of perfect information, a considerable group of scholars becomes sceptical 
about how to decide when to swing as well as about the accuracy of the swings in 
a world of imperfect and incomplete information, in which the antitrust authority 
has to judge on complex forms of business behaviour in complex markets with a 
multitude of knock-on effects. Especially in such environments, it is believed that 
market forces (at least in the long run) will automatically select the most efficient 
firms and lead to efficient market outcomes. Antitrust interventions, on the other 
hand, are believed to do more harm than good, especially because “economists … 
have not reached a consensus about the ultimate effects of various business 
practices ... [I]t seems likely that well-intentioned prosecutors and judges face ... 
some difficulty in distinguishing good from bad business practices” 
(Bittlingmayer, 1996: 371). 
The so-called private interest theories of regulation (and antitrust) even go one 
step further and question the general existence of well-intentioned prosecutors. 
These theories are based on the disbelief that the responsible individuals really 
base their decisions on the public aim of promoting economic efficiency. Stigler 
(1971), for instance, argues that enforcers - as well as politicians - will get 
captured by interest groups, and that these groups will use their regulatory and 
coercive powers to shape laws and regulations in a way that is beneficial to them 
(see Hüschelrath, 2005: 192ff., for a general description of these theories in a 
regulatory context). These public versus private-interest explanations for the 
development and persistence of antitrust law and enforcement are investigated 
back to the passing of the Sherman Act in the United States in 189019 (see Box 1 
below for an overview as well as Rowley and Rathbone, 2004, for a survey).   
                                                          
18  The economic literature discusses a multitude of aims of competition policy. Motta 
(2004: 177ff.), for instance, discusses welfare, consumer welfare, defense of smaller 
firms, promoting market integration, economic freedom, fighting inflation, fairness 
and equity, as well as other public policy factors effecting competition. See also Furse 
(1996) for a discussion on different aims of competition policies in the United States, 
the European Union and the United Kingdom.  
19  Ghosal and Gallo (2001) study the cyclical behaviour of the US Department of 
Justice’s antitrust enforcement activity between 1955 and 1994. They find that case 
activity is countercyclical; i.e., in an economic downturn, antitrust enforcement 
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Box 1. Congressional intent on passing the Sherman Act 
The motivations of the US Congress on passing the Sherman Act in 1890 has been 
the subject of several economic studies (see, for example, DeLorme et al., 1997). In 
general, two different types of economic explanations are offered. The first type is 
based on a public interest theory of antitrust and assumes that government 
interventions are motivated by correcting market inefficiencies resulting from 
monopolies. From that perspective, antitrust laws were initially designed to prevent 
higher prices for reasons of increased efficiency or preventing wealth transfers from 
consumers to producers (see, for example, Bork, 1966). The second type is based on 
a private interest group theory and assumes that special interest groups pressure 
legislators to create regulations that promote market inefficiencies. In other words, 
these approaches argue that US antitrust laws were designed to generate higher prices 
and lower outputs, protecting some special-interest groups rather than consumers 
(see, for example, DiLorenzo, 1985; Shughart and Tollison, 1991; Shughart, 1996).  
 
In addition to opportunistic behaviour of captured politicians and enforcers, the 
companies themselves might strategically (ab)use antitrust policy for their 
purposes. Baumol and Ordover (1985: 263) identified that such rent-seeking 
behaviour by competitors is widespread (and costly to the economy) and 
consequently asked for easy and costless remedies for such abuses of antitrust “by 
those who use it for protection from competition”. McAfee and Vakkur (2004) 
developed a taxonomy of strategic uses of antitrust laws.20 They identified the 
following seven strategic (ab)uses: 1) Extort funds from successful rival; 2) 
change the terms of the contract; 3) punish non-cooperative behaviour; 4) respond 
to an existing lawsuit; 5) prevent a hostile takeover; 6) discourage the entry of a 
rival; and 7) prevent a successful firm from competing vigorously. Without 
wanting to go though the whole taxonomy (see McAfee and Vakkur, 2004: 4ff.), a 
prominent example of a misuse of antitrust law (reflected in points 1 and 2 of the 
taxonomy) is to extort funds of a successful rival by saying “give me something 
(cash, better contract terms) and I won’t expose your vulnerability to an antitrust 
lawsuit”. Another typical misuse (reflected in point 3) exploits the expensive 
                                                                                                                                     
activity increases, and vice versa. Based on this empirical finding, the authors 
conclude that private interest group theories of antitrust enforcement are not 
supported, as they would expect increases in producer protection in economic 
downturns (i.e., procyclical enforcement). One possible explanation for the identified 
countercyclical pattern of antitrust enforcement activity is that the number of antitrust 
violations increases in economic downturns.     
20  It is important to remark that the literature on the strategic abuse of antitrust law 
concentrates on a system of private antitrust enforcement which is predicated on the 
idea that firms can sue firms. It is straightforward to see that such a system (as 
applied in the US) opens more possibilities for strategic behaviour than a system of 
public enforcement (such as currently dominant in the EU), in which the firms can 
only inform the antitrust authority about possible breaches of competition law but 
typically cannot directly bring a suit against a competitor. Such a system is likely to 
provide fewer opportunities for the strategic abuse of antitrust laws.  
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nature of antitrust lawsuits and the fact that it is typically cheaper to bring a 
lawsuit than to defend against one.21 This opens possibilities, for instance, to use 
antitrust law as a (threat of) punishment for the purpose of enforcing collusive 
agreements. In line with this argumentation, Yao (1998: 355ff.), in his survey on 
antitrust restrictions of competitive strategies, differentiates between strategies 
that simply include antitrust restrictions in business decisions defensively22 and 
strategies that use antitrust as an aggressive strategic weapon, for instance, to 
reach a ban for a certain merger which might threaten the own market position.      
From an empirical perspective, one way to investigate the necessity of 
competition policy is to analyse historic episodes with no or only lax antitrust 
enforcement. In the United Kingdom, Adam Smith (1776) already used this 
approach in his An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations 
and observed a general “tendency for collusion”. In Germany, Walter Eucken, 
amongst others, analysed historical experiences and found a general “tendency of 
monopolisation”23 (Eucken, 1952: 31). He concludes that competition policy is 
necessary to secure competitive market structures in the medium and long term 
and to preserve freedom as well as the organisation of the economic system 
(Wirtschaftsordnung) in general. 
                                                          
21  Bizjak and Coles (1995) study the implications for shareholder wealth of inter-firm 
(so-called private) antitrust litigation and find that the average defendant loses more 
than the average plaintiff gains. The average wealth loss for defendants is a 
statistically significant 0,6 percent of the equity value, or an average of $4 million. 
Given the fact that managerial compensations are often linked to performance, the 
negative price reaction for the defendant upon a filing suggests that lawsuits can 
provide significant incentives for firms to comply with antitrust laws. The average 
wealth gain for a plaintiff was estimated at approximately 1,2 percent of the equity 
value of the firm, or equivalently an average gain of $3 million. 
22  The relevance of so-called antitrust compliance programs as an integral part of a 
firm’s business strategy is shown by Yoffie and Kwak (2001). They explain how Intel 
avoids antitrust litigation while Microsoft has to cope with multiple antitrust suits. 
“Intel’s success is not a matter of luck. It’s a matter of painstaking planning and 
intense effort. The company’s antitrust compliance program, refined over many years, 
may not receive a lot of attention from the press and the public, but it’s been an 
integral element in the chip maker’s business strategy. In an age increasingly 
characterised by global markets that are dominated by a few huge companies, Intel’s 
approach to compliance provides a valuable model for any enterprise that may come 
under regulators’ scrutiny” (Yoffie and Kwak, 2001: 120). In the past, Michael Porter 
had been criticised for not considering antitrust violations as part of his books on 
Competitive Strategy and Competitive Advantage (see especially Fried and Oviatt, 
1989).  
23  “Anbieter und Nachfrager suchen stets - wo immer es möglich ist - Konkurrenz zu 
vermeiden und monopolistische Stellungen zu erwerben oder zu behaupten. Ein tiefer 
Trieb zur Beseitigung der Konkurrenz und zur Erwerbung von Monopolstellungen ist 
überall und zu allen Zeiten lebendig. … Universal besteht der ‘Hang zur 
Monopolbildung’ - ein Faktum, mit der alle Wirtschaftspolitik zu rechnen hat.” 
(Eucken, 1952: 31).  
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More recently, Baker (2003: 42) concluded in an essay that “[c]ompetition does 
not invariably happen by itself”, as firms have incentives to restrict competition 
either collusively or exclusively. Baker (2003: 36ff.) substantiates his view by 
evaluating evidence from four episodes of no or lax antitrust enforcement in the 
United States:   
 Industry performance before and shortly after the enactment of the Sherman 
Act (1890) 
 Studies of major industries during that period show successful though imperfect 
 collusion in steel (Scherer, 1996), bromine (Levenstein, 1997), railroads (Elli
 son, 1994; Porter, 1983) and petroleum refining (Granitz and Klein, 
 1996). The activities of Standard Oil and American Tobacco also illustrated 
 harmful exclusionary behaviour and showed the effects of anticompetitive mer-
 gers (see Granitz and Klein, 1996; Burns, 1986; Lamoreaux, 1985).   
 Industry performance in sectors in which the United States has successfully 
repealed the antitrust laws as they apply to export cartels (since 1918)  
Dick (1996) conducted a study on 111 cartel episodes covering 93 industries 
during the years 1918 to 1965 and found many examples of long-lived export 
agreements motivated by price-fixing; he also found, however, examples of 
cartels undermined by price wars and fringe competition. 
 Industry performance during the National Industrial Recovery Act (mid-1930s) 
which allowed industries to develop the Codes of Fair Competition  
 Several industries used the Codes as a vehicle for price-fixing through various 
 methods. Studies by McGahan (1995), focusing on breweries, and Baker 
 (1989), analysing steel producers, show that at least these industries exploited 
 the opportunity to collude and even managed to stabilise agreements for years 
 after the Codes were declared unconstitutional.  
 Industry performance during the second term of the Reagan administration 
(mid-1980) 
The second period of the Reagan administration was a period of relaxed anti-
trust enforcement (see Box 2 below for some empirical evidence), during which 
the antitrust authorities wanted to prevent certain likely anticompetitive merg-
ers but the transactions were nevertheless later permitted (e.g., by the Depart-
ment of Transportation). In particular, the acquisitions of Republic Airlines by 
Northwest Airlines and the purchase of Ozark Air Lines by Trans World 
Airlines were both characterised by substantially overlapping route networks of 
the merging parties. A study by Peters (2006), among others, shows that these 
mergers indeed led to higher fares (as well as a decrease in service quality) in 
some markets with estimated average price increases of at least 5-10% in city 
pairs where the two carriers had previously competed (see Pautler, 2003: 
167ff., for an overview). Hüschelrath (1998b: 347ff.) shows that the belief that 
airline markets are “perfectly contestable” in the sense of the theory of Baumol, 
Panzar and Willig (1982) led to the approval of these mergers.   
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An alternative way to study the effects of antitrust policy is to look at cross-
national studies. In a recent working paper, Krakowski (2005), for instance, 
explores the relationship between competition policy, experience in the 
application of competition policy, the intensity of local competition and the 
standard of living. He finds that the effectiveness of antitrust policy has a 
significant influence on the intensity of local competition. Furthermore, his results 
show that in countries with a high intensity of local competition, the standard of 
living is higher than in countries with a low intensity of local competition.  
Baker (2003) summarises studies which seek to understand why some nations 
have grown wealthy and others have not. These studies almost unanimously find 
that impediments to competition impede innovation, growth and prosperity (see, 
for example, Baumol, 2002; Shleifer and Vishny, 1998; Olson, 1982). Similarly, 
studies by business economists (see, for example, Porter, 1990) allow drawing the 
conclusion that differences in the power of competition across developed countries 
have been an important factor in explaining the difference in the performances of 
major industries across economies. 
Although the historical review so far corroborates the need for some kind of 
antitrust policy, there is also oppositional evidence. Crandall and Winston (2003) 
collected historical evidence to underpin the view that antitrust policy wasn’t 
successful in the past in terms of maximising consumer welfare. Their study, 
however, was heavily criticised - partly for its selective choice of empirical studies 
- by antitrust experts such as Connor24 (2004), Kwoka (2003) and Werden (2004).  
Bittlingmayer (2001) investigates the detrimental effects of antitrust 
enforcement on investment behaviour and industry structure. He uses antitrust 
case filings as a measure of regulatory uncertainty aiming at explaining some of 
the variation in industry investment by appealing to political or regulatory 
uncertainty. His results imply that the low investment level of the late 1950s and 
early 1960s in the United States was due at least in part to a resurgence of 
aggressive antitrust and related initiatives. He concludes that “whatever the ability 
of antitrust to lower prices and increase output in theory or in isolated 
circumstances, one actual effect of antitrust in practice may have been to curtail 
investment” (Bittlingmayer, 2001: 322). 
 
Box 2. Did lax antitrust enforcement in the 1980s increase concentration?  
In the United States, the 1980s were characterised by a lax antitrust enforcement, 
partly due to the influence of the Chicago School of Antitrust. In such a state, one 
would expect an increase in concentration due to anticompetitive mergers and 
successful monopolisation strategies. Based on a data set of concentration measures 
for 360 US manufacturing industries, the graph below shows the changes in the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index from 1982 (the beginning of the lax period) to 1992 
(after the end of the lax period).  
 
                                                          
24  Connor (2004: 1), for instance, writes: “This paper is an oddly slap-dash product far 
below the usual standards of the Journal of Economic Perspectives.” 
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Fig. 2. Change in Herfindahl-Hirschman Index from 1982 to 1992 
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Source: Own calculations based on data from US Census of Manufactures, 
Concentration ratios in manufacturing 1982 and 1992 (www.census.gov/epcd 
/www/concentration.html). Herfindahl-Hirschman index changes may partly be 
influenced by changes in the SIC structure from 1982 to 1992 
The graph as well as the calculated averages show that industrial concentration 
indeed increased in these ten years by about 10% on average. Although causality 
between this development and lax antitrust enforcement cannot be substantiated with 
the data at hand, it is especially interesting to see that the concentration in several 
industries increased dramatically, while others experienced a deconcentration 
process. This indicates that studying industry averages alone might say little about 
concentration effects of lax antitrust enforcement. Additionally, it has to be kept in 
mind that the graphs only show manufacturing industries and therefore miss 
important industries (such as the airline industry) in which concentration effects due 
to lax antitrust enforcement can be expected to be substantial (see Baker, 2003: 38).   
 
Shleifer and Vishny (1991) argue that while lax enforcement may lead to 
monopoly, tough enforcement could lead to an even worse industry structure: 
namely one dominated by conglomerates (see Box 3 below). Therefore, the 
authors vote for a lax merger enforcement standard. 
 
Box 3. Monopolies or conglomerates? 
Shleifer and Vishny (1991) review evidence on takeover waves in the 1960s and 
1980s in the United States and discuss the implications of this evidence for corporate 
strategy, agency theory, capital market efficiency and antitrust policy. With respect to 
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antitrust policy they generally find that it played an important role in the two 
takeover waves. “The extremely strict antitrust enforcement in the ‘60s made most 
related acquisitions infeasible, or at least costly, and so forced firms determined to 
make acquisitions to diversify” (Shleifer and Vishny, 1991: 58; see Matsusaka, 1996, 
for antithetic evidence). In other words, antitrust policy was at least partly 
responsible for the diversification wave at that time. In direct comparison to that, the 
authors argue that even if one sees some problems with the takeover wave (made 
possible due to lax antitrust enforcement) in the 1980s, it is hard to believe that they 
will turn out as bad as diversification in the 1960s. Consequently, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1991: 58) conclude that “[i]n a first best world, aggressive antitrust may be a 
good idea. But, in the world where corporations are committed to growth though 
acquisitions, antitrust policy of the ‘60s … had inadvertent effects much more 
damaging than the benefits it created. … There’s no question that … lax [antitrust] 
policy has led to some anticompetitive mergers, such as those in the airline industry, 
but it is better to have a few monopolies than a lot of conglomerates.” 
 
In a nutshell, it was shown that mainstream theoretical analysis - as well as the 
majority of empirical studies - comes to the conclusion that competition needs 
protection and - more importantly - that evidence has shown that competition 
policy actually helped to improve market performance, industry performance and 
the performance of the whole economy. However, it is important not to disregard 
the sceptical views on antitrust but to interpret them as a cornerstone of the 
continuous improvement of antitrust enforcement. Antitrust interventions have to 
be aware of enforcement’s significant influence on manager’s decisions, market 
behaviour and industry structure. In order to minimise uncertainty caused by 
antitrust enforcement, it must be the aim to develop, as clearly as possible, rules 
which are based on sound economic theories but understandable and applicable 
for people with academic backgrounds other than economics. 
4 Competition policy is worth it 
Even after concluding that competition is worth protecting and also (regularly) 
needs protection, the case for antitrust enforcement is still not closed. In a third 
step it has to be shown that the benefits of antitrust enforcement likely exceed its 
costs. In the words of Geroski (2004), the question Is competition policy worth it? 
has to be answered.  
In general, there are two ways to approach such a question. On an aggregate 
level, it can be assessed whether competition policy as a whole brings more 
benefits to society than it costs society. 25  On a disaggregate level, it can be 
                                                          
25  As argued by Kee and Hoekman (2003), the benefit of competition policy needs to be 
compared with the potential benefit of other policy options which could foster 
competition. Based on an empirical study of an international data set consisting of 28 
industries in 42 developed and developing countries from 1981 to 1998, the authors 
indeed conclude that reducing trade barriers and government regulations (as two 
major restrictions of domestic competition by impeding entry and exit of firms) 
would likely generate a higher rate of return than the adoption and enforcement of 
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investigated whether and to what extent certain sub-activities of the antitrust 
authorities - such as cartel or merger enforcement - contribute to the overall 
benefits of antitrust policy.      
4.1 Aggregate level 
In the following sections, the aggregated costs and benefits of antitrust 
enforcement for two countries are investigated further: the United States and the 
Netherlands. These two countries were basically chosen for two reasons. On the 
one hand, both countries are quite distinctive with respect to size: the United 
States had a GDP of about $12.970 billion in 2004 (at current prices), and the 
Netherlands had a GDP of about $629.900 million in 2004 (at current prices).26 On 
the other hand, both countries are quite distinctive with respect to their history of 
antitrust law: the United States enacted their first antitrust law in 1890, and the 
Netherlands did not reform their rudimentary competition law (from 1956) until 
January 1998 (see Konings et al., 2001: 845).   
 
4.1.1 Costs and benefits of antitrust enforcement in the United States 
On an aggregate level, some of the cost-side components of antitrust enforcement 
can be quantified relatively easily. The direct governmental costs in the United 
States are basically given by the budgets of the two enforcement agencies: the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Antitrust Division (AD) of the US 
Department of Justice (DOJ). The FTC (2004) splits its 2005 budget into two 
fractions: “consumer protection”, with roughly $118 million, and “maintaining 
competition”, with roughly $87 million. Only the latter is interpreted as part of the 
governmental costs of antitrust enforcement. The Antitrust Division (2006) is 
solely working on maintaining competition and had an annual budget in 2006 of 
roughly $139 million, leading to total governmental enforcement costs of about 
$226 million.    
In addition to the direct governmental costs, firms also generate costs caused by 
antitrust enforcement. These can be subdivided into basically two fractions: “costs 
by responding to government investigations” and “costs of private antitrust 
litigation”. Baker (2003) estimates that the former cost block sums up to roughly 
$500 million annually. He derives this estimate by using an average value of an 
antitrust case of $2,5 million (covering filing fees, lawyers and economic 
consultants; see Global Competition Review, 2003, as well as Box 4 for 
comparable evidence from the Airtours case in the European Union) and 
multiplying it by the number of second-request cases (roughly 200) in 2002 in the 
                                                                                                                                     
competition law. However, the increased significance of especially international 
cartels, despite shrinking trade barriers, suggests that reductions in trade barriers and 
government regulations are complements rather than substitutes to competition policy 
norms. In other words, although trade liberalisation and reductions of government 
regulations are typically worth promoting from an economic perspective, they do not 
make competition policy norms obsolete. 
26  Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, 2004 GDP data in current prices. 
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United States. The estimate for private antitrust litigation is taken from Salop and 
White (1986), adjusted for inflation, and adds up to about $400 million annually. 
Overall, the direct costs of antitrust enforcement add up to about $1.126 million.27 
 
Box 4. Legal and economic fees in Airtours case (1999) 
Neven (2005: 10) discusses evidence on the relative importance of economic and 
legal fees gathered from the records of the Airtours case (1999). Airtours attempted 
to acquire First Choice; however, the European Commission banned the proposed 
acquisition. Nevertheless, Airtours succeeded in its appeal in the Court of First 
Instance (CFI). As a consequence, the Commission was ordered to pay the cost that 
Airtours had incurred in the procedure. These costs are shown in Table 3 below. 
As shown in Table 3, the fees claimed by Airtours add up to more than €2,2 
million overall with about 80% of these fees referring to the work of lawyers and the 
remaining 20% to the work of economists. Interestingly, the Commission refused to 
pay the amounts Airtours requested, claiming that they were exaggerated. In the end, 
the CFI had to rule on the amount, and the Commission was ordered to repay about 
32% of the costs claimed by Airtours. 
Table 3. Legal and economic fees in Airtours case (1999) 
 Claimed by AT      Accepted by CFI            
 
in € in % in € in % in % of claimed 
Barrister 424.105 19% 258.068 36% 61% 
Solicitors 1.290.342 58% 379.512 53% 29% 
Solicitors (expenses) 29.616 1% 0 0% 0% 
Economic consultancy 426.650 19% 45.541 6% 11% 
Academic economists 51.440 2% 29.579 4% 58% 
Legal fees in Luxembourg 941 0% 0 0% 0% 
Total 2.223.094 100% 712.702 100% 32% 
Underlying £-€ exchange rate: 1,52 (1999 average) 
 
                                                          
27  In a survey, PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2003) investigated whether the time and costs 
of business devoted to multi-jurisdictional merger reviews has the effect of a factual 
tax on mergers. The study finds that, although such a tax exists, it is on average 
clearly below 1% of the overall value of the merger deals. The study further finds that 
the typical multi-jurisdictional merger deal requires 8 completed or considered filings 
and generates on average €3,3 million in external merger review costs; 65% of these 
costs are legal fees, 19% are filing fees and 14% are fees for other advisers. The 
survey shows further that a few major deals with at least one in-depth review by an 
antitrust authority incurred costs of more than €10 million. Taking internal and 
external costs together, deals involving an in-depth review are eight to ten times more 
expensive than those subject only to an initial review (see PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 
2003: 4f.). 
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In addition to the direct costs of antitrust enforcement, indirect costs, which are 
somewhat more difficult to delineate and estimate, must be taken into account. 
Baker (2003) considers the opportunity cost of management time devoted to 
antitrust compliance and litigation as well as any lost efficiencies if beneficial 
activities are deterred by the prospect of antitrust enforcement28 (see also Crandall 
and Winston, 2003: 5f.).29 Baker (2003) assumes that the indirect costs are roughly 
equal to the direct costs, leading to total annual costs of antitrust enforcement in 
the United States of about $2.126 million (see Table 4 below).  
Table 4. Direct and indirect costs of US antitrust enforcement 
  
million    
US-$ 
DIRECT COSTS 1.126 
 Federal Trade Commission  87 Direct governmental costs 
 Antitrust Division 139 
 Costs responding to government investigations 500 Direct private costs 
 Costs of private litigation 400 
INDIRECT COSTS 1.000 
Opportunity costs of management time (Compliance and litigation) n.a. 
Deterrence of beneficial activities by antitrust rules n.a. 
OVERALL  COSTS 2.126 
Sources: FTC, 2004; DOJ-AD, 2005; Baker, 2003; GCR, 2003; Salop and White, 1986 
                                                          
28  Generally, the magnitude of especially the indirect costs of deterring beneficial 
activities by the design and enforcement of suboptimal antitrust rules is disputed 
among antitrust scholars. While some argue that Baker’s estimate could be a realistic 
ballpark figure, others are of the opinion that these costs are substantially larger and 
typically dwarf any other costs of antitrust enforcement discussed above. I would like 
to thank Michael Waldman for pointing this out to me.     
29  Bittlingmayer and Hazlett (2000) analyse whether antitrust actions against Microsoft 
have created value in the computer industry. They hypothesise that a large number of 
computer firms which have products that are tied to the success of the allegedly 
monopolised Microsoft product (Disk Operating Systems) should prosper if actions 
are taken (by Microsoft or the DOJ) to make these operating systems costless, 
function better, or provide a more convenient platform for popular products. Policy 
actions that are expected to constrain Microsoft’s market power effectively should 
simultaneously increase efficiency and improve profitability of firms throughout the 
sector. Bittlingmayer and Hazlett examine share price reactions for both Microsoft 
and a portfolio of 159 other computer firms around 54 antitrust enforcement 
announcements involving Microsoft over the seven years from 1991 to 1997. They 
find that antitrust action against Microsoft appears to inflict capital losses on the 
computer sector as a whole. Each enforcement action lowered Microsoft’s stock by 
1,2%, roughly $3 billion at May 1998 share prices. Furthermore, each enforcement 
action decreased a broad index of other computer stocks by 0,7%, equivalent to an 
additional loss of $5 billion in May 1998.    
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On the benefits side of antitrust enforcement, the first quantification efforts 
were estimations of the sizes of the deadweight loss triangles discussed in section 
2 above. Applying the basic equation for the deadweight loss (see Equation 1 
above), it is indeed straightforward to derive a first back-of-the-envelope estimate 
of the (potential) benefits of antitrust enforcement: Suppose that 10% of a 
country’s national output is produced in monopolised industries, that the average 
price-cost margin is 0,2 and that the average market demand elasticity is 1,5 (see 
Leibenstein, 1966, and Rowley and Rathbone, 2004, for comparable calculations.) 
Using Equation 1 above then leads to a deadweight loss of 1,5% of the total GDP. 
Using the actual GDP figure for the United States in 2004 (about $12.970 billion), 
Figure 3 plots the corresponding deadweight losses for varying elasticities and 
price-cost margins. 
As shown in Figure 3, with an average market demand elasticity of 1,5 and an 
average price-cost margin of 0,4, the corresponding deadweight loss lies in the 
range of $150-200 billion (the exact value is $156 billion). Even with a 
substantially smaller price-cost margin of 0,1 and an average market demand 
elasticity of 1,0, the deadweight loss would still be around $6 billion and therefore 
about three times larger than the estimated costs of antitrust enforcement.    
Although the benefits of antitrust enforcement shown in Figure 3 typically 
dwarf the generated costs, it is obvious that these estimates are very rough. In 
addition to the general criticism of deadweight loss studies (largely based on their 
assumptions and data-sets used; see section 2 above), Posner (2001: 17ff.) argues 
that neither of these studies can properly be used to measure the gains from having 
antitrust laws. “They measure the costs of monopoly given the existence of those 
laws, not the costs of monopoly that could be expected in the absence of such 
laws. In a sense they measure the degree to which the antitrust rules have failed”30 
(Posner, 2001: 17). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
30  Baker (2003: 45) agrees with Posner’s argument, adding, however, that such a 
“minimum estimate of the potential gains from additional antitrust enforcement 
provides a benchmark for assessing the benefits of current enforcement activity, 
under the plausible assumption that the efficiency gains achieved by preventing 
anticompetitive conduct - the deterrence benefits of antitrust - are at least as large as 
the potential gains from additional enforcement, which the Harberger framework 
measures”.  
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Fig. 3. Deadweight loss (in billion US-$) against demand elasticity and price-cost margin 
(10% of US industry monopolised) 
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An alternative way to measure the benefits of antitrust enforcement is to argue 
that antitrust interventions eventually lead to a decline in the price-cost margin. 
The benefits of antitrust policy can then be expressed by the deadweight loss 
differential between the before-enforcement and after-enforcement values of the 
(average) price-cost margin.31 Figure 4 below shows these differentials (i.e., the 
                                                          
31  In a recent paper, Boone (2006) argues why the price-cost margin is not a measure of 
success for competition policy for an antitrust authority that aims at maximising 
consumer welfare. Warzynski (2001) tests whether antitrust policy had an impact on 
the price-cost margins in the US manufacturing industry. His results indicate the 
presence of market power in many industries but also substantial heterogeneity of 
behaviour, across both time and industries. However, he concludes that price-cost 
margins were significantly lower when the antitrust policy was very tough. Konings 
et al. (2001) investigate the impact of competition policy on the level and the 
dynamics of firm price-cost margins in the Belgian and Dutch manufacturing 
industries. Belgium significantly strengthened their competition law in 1993, while 
the Netherlands followed a more lenient approach until the very end of the last 
century. The empirical results show that the reform of competition policy in Belgium 
did not have any significant effect on the price-cost margins in Belgium. However, a 
comparison between Belgium and the Netherlands revealed that price-cost margins in 
the Netherlands were significantly higher than those in Belgium. Additionally, Kee 
and Hoekman (2003) found for an international data set consisting of 28 industries in 
42 developed and developing countries from 1981 to 1998 that the direct effect of 
antitrust law on industry price-cost margins is not significant for a sample consisting 
of all countries. However, the effect of antitrust law on industry price-cost margins 
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reductions in deadweight loss) for the United States (again based on 2004 GDP 
data) against the demand elasticity and the changes of the price-cost margin (in 0,1 
steps).    
Fig. 4. Reduction in deadweight loss (in billion US-$) against demand elasticity and 
changes in price-cost margin (10% of US industry monopolised) 
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As shown in Figure 4, a reduction in the price-cost margin from 0,4 to 0,3 at an 
average demand elasticity of 1,5 would lead to reductions in the deadweight loss 
in a range of $50-$75 billion (the exact value is $68 billion). For a demand 
elasticity of 1,0, the reduction of the deadweight loss would still be in the range of 
$25-50 billion (the exact value is $45 billion). In both cases, the benefits of 
antitrust enforcement still dwarf the cost estimate derived above.   
In addition to the analysis so far, there are basically two major reasons why the 
true benefits of antitrust enforcement are substantially larger than stated so far: 
additional losses of monopoly and the deterrence effect of existing antitrust laws. 
With respect to the former, section 2 already showed that rent-seeking activities 
and productive inefficiencies can be interpreted as such additional losses of 
monopoly. If conservative estimates of these losses are also taken into account 
(DWL: 0,1%, RSA: 1,0%, PI: 1,0% of GDP) and applied to the GDP figure of 
$12.970 billion for the United States in the year 2004, the (potential) benefits of 
antitrust enforcement add up to roughly $272,4 billion ($13,0 billion 
DWL+$129,7 billion RSA + $129,7 billion PI).   
                                                                                                                                     
increases with the size of the economy, indicating that antitrust policy may be more 
important for larger countries.   
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The second argument which speaks for a too-low estimate (in Fig. 3) is the 
deterrence effect of antitrust rules. Deterrence basically means that existing 
antitrust rules (and their enforcement) encourage firms not to behave in 
anticompetitive ways which would have lead to negative welfare effects in the 
absence of such rules. This “encouragement” can be based either on a general 
attitude to respect the law and/or on the fear of antitrust investigations and fines. 
Although the existence of such a deterrence effect is beyond controversy, its 
quantification is surely a very challenging task.32 Baker (2003: 40) and Geroski 
(2004: 8) simply have the feeling that the deterrence effect very likely delivers 
more benefits alone than all the other benefits (discussed above) together.  
In a nutshell, although several benefits and cost components are hard or almost 
impossible to estimate, it is likely that on an aggregate level for the United States, 
antitrust policy as a whole brings more benefits than costs to society.  
 
4.1.2 Costs and benefits of antitrust enforcement in the Netherlands 
In a study on behalf of the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs, Oxera (2004a;  
2004b) develops a conceptual framework to assess the costs and benefits of 
market regulators (Oxera, 2004a) and applies it in the second part of the report to 
the respective institutions in the Netherlands. 33  The conceptual framework 
distinguishes between two possible counterfactuals to the present antitrust 
enforcement regime: 1.) no competition law and no Dutch competition authority 
(Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit, hereafter referred to as NMa) and 2.) 
private enforcement of competition law 34  and no NMa. While the first 
counterfactual would lead to an analysis of the costs and benefits of both 
competition law and competition policy, the second alternative would allow a 
comparison of the costs and benefits of having the NMa as an institution (see 
Oxera, 2004a: 7). Oxera concentrates their study on the latter counterfactual. Their 
(qualitative) results are summed up below in Table 5. 
As Table 5 shows, the cost side of antitrust enforcement by the NMa (compared 
to the counterfactual of private litigation under existing competition law) is 
structured into four sections: the direct costs of the running the NMa, the direct 
                                                          
32  At first sight, the results of Masson and Shannan (1984), presented in section 2, might 
answer this question. However, although Masson and Shannan estimate that the gains 
from competition are 8.7%, this value cannot be interpreted as a gain of antitrust 
policy, as even in the absence of any kind of antitrust law competition would likely 
prevail in most industries.  
33  The market regulators in the Netherlands are the Competition Authority (NMa), the 
Post and Telecommunications Authority (OPTA), the Financial Markets Authority 
(FMA), the Office of Energy Regulation (DTe), the Transport Chamber and the 
Healthcare Authority (NZa) (see Oxera, 2004a: 1). 
34  Private antitrust enforcement basically means that existing competition laws are not 
enforced by an antitrust authority but rather through private litigation by especially 
competitors, suppliers and customers. In the United States, for instance, around 90% 
of all federal antitrust cases originate from private cases. See Jones (1999) and Oxera 
(2004a: 22ff.) for further discussions.  
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costs of the regulated firms, economic costs to the investigated markets (e.g., by 
making enforcement mistakes) and indirect regulatory costs created by regulatory 
uncertainty among firms. On the benefits side, Oxera identifies economic benefits 
to the markets in question (essentially by increasing allocative, productive and 
dynamic efficiency) as well as indirect regulatory benefits, such as deterrence 
effects of existing antitrust laws (and their enforcement).    
Based on the arguments shown in Table 5, Oxera (2004b: 1ff.) continues in the 
second part of the report with the quantification of especially the cost part of their 
conceptual framework. The direct governmental costs are given by the budget of 
the NMa, which was about €22 million in 2003. In terms of administrative costs of 
firms in relation to Dutch competition law (e.g., filling in notification forms, 
dealing with information requests), Oxera uses a measure derived by a survey 
from the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs (MEA), which estimates these costs 
at €2,38 million per year (in 2002). However, these administrative costs are likely 
to underestimate the true costs for the firms, especially if in-depth analyses of 
merger cases are considered. A survey by PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2003: 4) 
found that a typical multi-jurisdictional merger deal generates on average €3,3 
million in external merger review costs. However, the survey shows further that a 
few major deals with at least one in-depth review by an antitrust authority incurred 
costs of more than €10 million. 
Table 5. Costs and benefits of the NMa against the counterfactual of private litigation 
under existing competition law 
Costs  Benefits 
Direct costs of the NMa 
 Total administrative costs of the NMa 
  Minus administrative costs of the 
judiciary system dealing with private 
litigation  
 
Direct costs of regulated firms 
 Total costs incurred by firms to 
comply with competition law and in 
relation to specific competition law 
proceedings  
 Minus costs incurred in private 
litigation cases 
 
Economic costs to the markets in question 
 Allocative, productive and dynamic 
inefficiency may result from 
unintended mistakes by NMa (e.g., 
excessive intervention or prohibition of 
efficient (and hence welfare-
enhancing) practices) 
 Minus any such costs caused by 
Economic benefits to the markets in 
question 
 Allocative, productive and dynamic 
efficiency achieved through prevention 
of cartel and other anticompetitive 
behaviour that would not be 
challenged under private litigation 
 Enhanced product/service quality and 
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decisions of judiciary system  innovation achieved through 
promotion of a competitive market 
environment 
Indirect regulatory costs 
 Regulatory uncertainty among firms 
due to open-ended nature of 
competition law prohibitions (may be 
mitigated through clear guidance by 
the NMa and case law over time) 
 Minus any such uncertainty caused 
under private litigation 
 
Indirect regulatory benefits 
 Active enforcement of prohibition in 
competition law has deterrent effects 
on cartels and other anticompetitive 
behaviour that would not be 
challenged under private litigation 
 Active stance of the NMa contributes 
to overall government objective of 
achieving a competitive culture, away 
from previous “cartel paradise” culture 
in the Dutch economy  
Source: Oxera, 2004a: 28. 
Based on the PWC survey results, Oxera (2004b: 2) estimates the typical costs 
of a firm in a single EU jurisdiction. The internal costs of a first-stage merger were 
estimated to fall into a range of €20.000-€40.000 and €80.000-€120.000 for an in-
depth merger review. In terms of external cost to firms, Oxera estimates a range 
from €110.000 to €160.000 for a first-stage merger and €600.000 to €900.000 for 
an in-depth merger review. Taking a subset of the average number of cases the 
NMa has dealt with in each year, the following rough approximation of the cost of 
firms due to antitrust enforcement can be obtained. 
Table 6. Annual costs to firms due to a subset antitrust enforcement by the NMa 
Type of case Number of cases 
dealt with by NMa 
(average per year 
over period 2001-
03) 
Estimated cost       
per case (€) 
Total costs          
(€ million) 
Notifications of 
agreements 84 130.000 - 200.000 10,9 - 16,8 
Notifications of 
mergers 
95 130.000 - 200.000 12,4 - 19,0 
Reports based on 
reasonable 
suspicion of 
contravention of 
competition law 
(in-depth) 
9 680.000 - 1.120.000 6,1 - 10,1 
In-depth merger 
reviews 
2 680.000 - 1.120.000 1,4 – 2,2 
Total   30,8 - 48,1 
Source: Oxera, 2004b: 2 
  32
The estimates presented in Table 6 do not take costs of other proceedings (e.g., 
complaints or appeals) or general compliance costs incurred by firms into account. 
Overall, the costs of the private sector together with the direct governmental cost 
of about €22 million lead to a cost estimate between €52 million to €70 million 
(Oxera, 2004b: 22). Oxera undertakes no attempt to quantify the aggregate 
benefits of antitrust enforcement in the Netherlands; however, they estimate the 
welfare effects of three antitrust cases in more detail. One of these cases is 
presented in the discussion of the disaggregate level in the following section.  
4.2 Disaggregate level 
The analysis of the costs and benefits on an aggregate level basically give an 
indication that the sign of the net welfare effect of antitrust policy is likely to be 
positive. Although this is surely important information, it only presents half of the 
story, because it masks the partial contributions of the different areas of antitrust 
enforcement to the overall success of antitrust enforcement. In the words of 
Rowley and Rathbone (2004: 17), “economists cannot confidently rely on dead-
weight cost arguments to justify on efficiency grounds a per-se policy of antitrust 
intervention … In principle, it is clear that a very detailed case-by-case study is 
required to determine whether or not specific instances of monopoly, whether 
induced by conspiracy, by merger or by internal expansion, is justified in terms of 
economic criteria.” 
It is beyond the scope of this section to try to derive or collect separate 
estimates for the contribution of every area of antitrust policy. However, what can 
be done is analysing single cases of antitrust enforcement and show whether their 
contribution to the benefits of antitrust enforcement alone was significant 
compared to the overall enforcement costs derived above. Geroski (2004) 
followed such an approach for selected cases in the United Kingdom and from his 
viewpoint as the chairman of the Competition Commission (who regularly has to 
justify the budgets for his authority). Following Geroski’s approach, two case 
studies are presented in the Annexes 6.1 and 6.2: the lysine cartel case, focusing 
on cartel enforcement in the United States, and the Nuon-Reliant merger case, 
focusing on merger enforcement in the Netherlands. Both case studies allow a 
quantification of the benefits of antitrust enforcement.  
The quantitative results of the two case studies on cartels and mergers both 
show substantial contributions to the benefits of antitrust enforcement. In the US 
lysine cartel case, it is found that the overcharge (excluding the price war) adds up 
to about $113 million in total, which can be translated into an average overcharge 
of 22,82% of sales (in a range from 13,48% to 36,92%). The deadweight loss was 
assumed to be at 10% of the overcharge and therefore is about $11 million for the 
whole cartel period.35 In the Dutch Nuon-Reliant merger case, the redistribution 
                                                          
35  One possibility to underpin this allegation is to argue that without successful cartel 
enforcement, the respective cartel would have continued to exist, causing welfare 
losses. In other words, the direct benefits of detecting a cartel can be approximated by 
the net present value of the yearly benefits in the future. See Annex 6.1 for a more 
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effect (per year) appears to be substantial across the board (between 5,57%, or 
about €280 million, and 11,72%, or about €612 million, of post-merger sales), 
while the deadweight losses are, because of the typically low demand elasticity in 
electricity markets, relatively small (between 0,60%, or about €1,7 million, and 
1,36%, or about €8,2 million, of the redistribution effect). To a certain extent, the 
results of the two case studies confirm the results of the aggregate approach: The 
redistribution effects of increases in market power seem to be significantly larger 
than the actual deadweight loss – which is the primary aim of an efficiency-
oriented competition policy.  
An underpinning of this finding can be achieved by casting an eye on studies 
which try to aggregate the (costs and) benefits of cartel and merger enforcement. 
Connor and Helmers (2006), for instance, present a study in which they analysed a 
large dataset of 283 private international cartels that existed between 1990 and 
2005. They provide estimates of the overcharges for all of these cartels for the 
United States, Canada, the European Union and other regions. Furthermore, they 
estimate that the deadweight loss adds between 10% and 30% of the overcharges 
to receive an estimate of the overall customer losses (see Connor and Helmers, 
2006: 21). Using 10% as a defensive estimate of the deadweight loss and 30% as 
an aggressive estimate, it is possible to estimate the overall customer losses of 283 
private international cartels between 1990 and 2005. The results are presented in 
Table 7 below (see Tables 49 to 52 in Annex 6.7 for the full data tables and the 
spreadsheet calculations). 
Table 7. Customer losses due to 283 cartels operating between 1990 and 2005 
  
  
Overcharges 
Defensive 
DWL estimate  
(10%) 
Aggressive 
DWL estimate 
(30%) 
Total 
customer 
losses 
(defensive 
estimate) 
Overall Million Real 2005 US Dollars 
United States 54.001 5.400 16.200 59.402 
Canada 975 97 292 1.072 
European Union 99.459 9.946 29.838 109.405 
Other regions  21.137 2.114 6.341 23.251 
All countries 175.573 17.557 52.672 193.130 
Yearly average Million Real 2005 US Dollars 
United States 3.375 338 1.013 3.713 
Canada 61 6 18 67 
European Union 6.216 622 1.865 6.838 
Other regions  1.321 132 396 1.453 
Source: Calculations are based on data from Connor and Helmers, 2006: 49ff. 
                                                                                                                                     
detailed discussion on the occasion of the assessment of the customer losses caused 
by the lysine cartel in the United States.  
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As shown in Table 7, aggregate cartel overcharges for the four regions add up 
to more than $175 billion for the period from 1990 to 2005. A defensive estimate 
of the deadweight loss of 10% of the overcharges adds almost $18 billion to the 
overall customer losses caused by these cartels of more than $193 billion. 
Focusing only on the data for the United States shows overcharges of $54 billion 
and a defensive estimate of the deadweight loss of $5,4 billion for the period from 
1990 to 2005. 
In terms of the overall benefits of merger enforcement in the United States, the 
Government Performance and Result Act requires agencies to monitor their 
performance. In order to meet these requirements, the FTC and the AD of the DOJ 
quantify “the dollar savings for consumers resulting from agencies’ actions 
stopping anticompetitive merger activity” and “non-merger activity” as part of 
their annual performance measures. For the fiscal year 2001, for instance, the FTC 
calculated consumer savings of $2,5 billion resulting from merger activities and 
further $157 million savings for consumers resulting from non-merger activities.36 
The DOJ reported to Congress that the AD merger enforcement efforts saved 
consumers at least $4,094 billion in the fiscal year 1998 and $2,551 billion in the 
fiscal year 1999 (see Nelson and Sun, 2001: 927).  
In terms of methodology used to come to these estimates, both agencies use a 
consumer savings estimate constructed by multiplying an estimate of the price 
increase that would have occurred by the volume of commerce in the respective 
relevant market affected. For the derivation of the price increase estimates, two 
different approaches are used. For homogenous product markets the following 
formula derived from a standard Cournot model is used: 
postmerger
m
D HHI
HHI
p
p

   (7) 
with (Δp/p) representing the percentage increase in price that would have resulted 
if the merger had been allowed to proceed, ΔHHI representing the change in the 
HHI that would have resulted and HHIpostmerger representing the corresponding 
post-merger HHI. Following the example of Nelson and Sun (2001: 929f.), if an 
industry has five firms that each have a market share of 20 percent pre-merger and 
the market demand elasticity is equal to 1,0, a two-firm merger would lead to an 
increase in the HHI of 0,08 and the equation above would therefore predict a 
11,1% increase in price.     
The second approach to estimate the price increase that would have resulted if 
the antitrust authorities hadn’t stopped the merger is used for mergers which 
involve differentiated products. In such cases, merger simulations are run to 
estimate the percentage change in price. As explained by Nelson and Sun (2001: 
931), the simulation models are based on the Bertrand assumption that a firm 
                                                          
36  The values for FY 2002/FY 2003 were $726 million/$292 million (merger) and $86 
million/$211 million ((non-merger); see FTC (2006: 20). Starting with the fiscal year 
2004, the FTC discontinued the savings measure and replaced it by an estimate of the 
dollar volume of commerce in markets in which FTC took action to prevent 
anticompetitive mergers and other competitive conduct (see FTC, 2006: 20). 
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chooses a profit-maximising price assuming that competitors will maintain their 
current prices. For both approaches, Nelson and Sun (2001) extensively discuss 
the underlying assumptions and therefore the limitations of the significance of 
consumer savings figures which are derived by these techniques. 37   
For the Netherlands, Postema et al. (2006) try to measure the costs and benefits 
of merger control by using merger simulation tools. The authors compare the 
hypothetical situation in which all mergers would have been approved (‘the 
counterfactual’) to the actual situation of merger control in which mergers with 
clear anticompetitive effects were prohibited or remedied by the NMa. For the 
period between 1998 and 2002, eleven rejected mergers were identified; however, 
data availability and data confidentiality issues finally allow the authors to study 
four mergers in more detail. With these four mergers/markets, four sensitivity 
analyses were run using four different demand models suitable for merger 
simulation. 38 It turned out that only the linear and log-linear demand functions 
produced sensible results which were then used to estimate the ‘prevented price 
increases due to merger control’. The results show that - for the four markets - 
price increases between 4,0% and 21,7% would have resulted in the absence of 
merger control leading to a weighted average price increase of about 14%. 
Applying this figure to the nine relevant cases 39 in which a merger was prohibited 
(or later allowed subject to ‘healing’ remedies) led to a welfare gain of merger 
enforcement in the Netherlands between 1998 and 2002 of roughly €770 million. 
On the cost side, Postema et al. (2006) basically uses the estimates derived in the 
Oxera study presented above which led to an estimate for the overall costs of 
antitrust enforcement of at most €120 million. The net welfare effect of merger 
control can therefore be quantified at about €100 million per year. 
 
5  Conclusions 
 
The aim of the paper was an assessment of the costs and benefits of antitrust 
enforcement. The analysis showed, first, that competition is typically desirable. 
                                                          
37  For the homogenous goods approach the somewhat critical assumptions are: (1) the 
products are homogenous, (2) all firms have constant marginal costs, (3) the merger 
does not change the cost structure of the firm, (4) the merger does not change the 
behaviour of the firms, (5) the post-merger market share of the firms is equal to the 
sum of their pre-merger market shares, (6) the elasticity of demand is constant over 
the relevant range of sales levels and (7) there is no entry. For the differentiated goods 
approach, especially the assumptions about the underlying demand system are added 
to the general problems named for the homogenous goods approach (see generally 
Nelson and Sun, 2001: 935ff.).  
38  The four basic approaches to model the demand side in a merger simulation are linear 
demand, log-linear demand, logit demand and the almost ideal demand system.  
39  From the total of eleven cases, the authors exclude two cases in the electricity 
industry because these markets are typically characterised best by Cournot 
competition and therefore conflict with the author’s modelling assumption of 
Bertrand competition (see Postema et al., 2006: 94).  
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Second, it was found that without antitrust policy, firms could and would 
(permanently) exercise market power to the detriment of overall welfare as well as 
consumer welfare. Although this finding may justify the introduction of antitrust 
policy norms, it was also found that antitrust enforcement has to be used 
cautiously in order to avoid business distortions causing more harm than good. 
Subsequently, an estimation of the costs and benefits of antitrust enforcement 
suggested - at least for the United States and the Netherlands - that the realised 
benefits overtop the realised costs by far as long as overcharges/redistribution 
effects and deadweight losses are considered as welfare loss. However, under a 
total welfare approach, only the avoidance of deadweight losses can be considered 
as benefit of antitrust policy and then, the benefits estimated for cartel and merger 
enforcement under a disaggregate approach weren’t able to cover the derived cost 
estimate for the United States and the Netherlands. 40 However, it should be kept 
in mind that the deterrence effect as an important benefit of antitrust laws and 
enforcement didn’t enter the quantification. Generally, it has to be reminded that 
some cost and benefit components can hardly be measured with satisfactory 
accuracy. 
 
6  Annex 
 
6.1 Estimating customer losses due to cartelisation - Evidence from the lysine 
cartel in the United States 
 
One prominent contributor to the overall benefits of antitrust enforcement is cartel 
enforcement. Although the largest benefits probably come from the deterrence 
effect of cartel laws (which can hardly be measured in its scope), an analysis of 
customer losses due to actual cartelisation reveals important insights into the 
desirability of cartel enforcement from a consumer welfare perspective. One 
possibility to underpin this allegation is to argue that without successful cartel 
                                                          
40  For the United States, costs of about $2,1 billion p.a. were estimated. While the 
aggregate approach resulted in a benefits estimate of about $6,0 billion p.a., the 
disaggregate approach result in savings of about $3,38 billion p.a. (overcharges) and 
about $0,34 billion p.a. (deadweight loss) on average for cartel enforcement. The 
lysine case study showed an overall overcharge of about $113 million over the whole 
cartel period of 23 months, however, only a deadweight loss saving of about $11,3 
million over the whole cartel period. It can be seen that the deadweight loss ‘savings’ 
alone cannot cover the overall costs of antitrust enforcement. The same conclusion is 
basically true for the Netherlands where the cost estimate was about €61,5 million 
p.a. The benefits estimate of Postema et al. (2006) led to an estimate of about €154 
million p.a. from merger enforcement alone (focusing on deadweight losses and 
redistribution effects). The case study of the Nuon-Reliant case again showed that the 
redistribution loss of about €280 million p.a. could cover the enforcement costs for 
the whole Dutch antitrust system. However, again, the deadweight losses alone are 
relatively small (about €1,7 million p.a.) and cannot cover the costs of antitrust 
enforcement. 
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enforcement, the respective cartel would have continued to exist causing welfare 
losses. In other words, the direct benefits of detecting a cartel can be approximated 
by the net present value of the yearly benefits for society in the future.  
Notwithstanding the desirability of such an analysis, it is important to note that 
not all customer losses are relevant for an antitrust policy that strictly follows a 
total welfare standard. Especially the consumers that just pay more for their 
products are not reflected in the total welfare loss as their loss in surplus is just 
redistributed to the producers. The total welfare loss of a cartel agreement is 
created by the customers who would have bought the product at the competitive 
price but refrain from buying the product at the elevated cartel price. This total 
welfare loss is reflected in the so-called deadweight loss.  
The detection of a cartel typically leads to two types of antitrust suits: a 
criminal suit and a private suit. In the criminal suit, the state basically punishes the 
cartel members for their misdemeanour or felony with fines and probably even 
incarceration of the individuals responsible for the cartel agreement, while in the 
so-called private antitrust suits, potentially damaged private parties can sue the 
cartel members for compensation of their damages. In US antitrust law, for 
example, up to treble damages are possible as compensation creating an additional 
fine for cartelisation as well as an incentive to bring suits for the potentially 
damaged parties. The follow-up question of which parties are considered as 
‘potentially damaged’ is given in Figure 5 below.  
Fig. 5. Potentially damaged parties due to cartel members increasing prices 
 
Source: Inspired by a comparable Figure in Clark et al., 2004: 13 
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As Figure 5 shows, on the upstream level, input suppliers of the cartel members 
might be damaged due to the reduction in sales volume caused by the cartel. 
Furthermore, the reduction in sales might lead to diseconomies of scale in the 
production process of the input suppliers and correspondingly might lead to an 
increase in its average total cost. As a consequence, every firm using the input 
product is eventually harmed by the cartel agreement due to elevated input prices. 
41 
On the level of the cartel agreement, it is possible that non-cartel members have 
suffered due to the cartel agreement. However, as theoretical research has shown, 
it can very well be the case that non-cartel members manage to take advantage of 
the cartel (i.e. raised their prices and profits compared to the competitive 
counterfactual) without actually joining the cartel (see generally Phlips, 1995: 
23ff.). Additionally, producers of complementary products to the cartelised 
product might have been damaged due to lower sales caused by the cartel 
agreement. To give a practical example, if a shoe cartel is formed and the 
production and sales of shoes is reduced, it is imaginable that the producers of 
shoe polish (the complementary product) experience a decline in demand and 
consequently might also be damaged by the cartel agreement.   
On the downstream level, the so-called ‘direct’ effect of the cartel is the 
damage caused by charging elevated prices to the direct purchasers of the cartel 
product. Typically, this damage is calculated by multiplying the difference 
between the price charged by the cartel and the price that would have existed in 
the absence of the cartel (the so-called ‘but for’ price) with the respective sales 
volumes. Although the basic calculation concept is straightforward, its practical 
implementation is often challenging; especially the fixing of the ‘but-for’ price is a 
difficult exercise as the resulting damage amount is typically sensitive to changes 
in the ‘but-for’ price. In the following, such a calculation of damages (and 
deadweight losses) is exemplified with data from the (global) lysine cartel which 
                                                          
41  The question if and to what extent such cost increases are passed on downstream 
basically depends on the so-called ‘pass-on rate’ which is (in a competitive industry) 
given by   mSmD11  . mD  represents the market demand elasticity and mS  
stands for the market supply elasticity, i.e. the percentage increase in marginal costs 
when the output rises by one percent. Supposing a demand elasticity of 0,5 and a 
market supply elasticity of 1,0, the pass-on rate can be calculated to (1/(1+(0,5*1)))= 
0,67. See van Dijk and Verboven (2005) as well as Kosicki and Cahill (2006) for 
longer treatments of pass-on rates - and indirect purchaser analysis generally - in 
cartel damage cases. The authors also provide an assessment of the chances of the 
potentially damaged parties (on different downstream levels) to prevail in court with 
their damage claims. In general, no restitution is granted to parties who weren’t 
customers of the cartel but argue that they would have bought the cartel product at 
competitive prices. In other words, the deadweight loss caused by the cartel is not part 
of the damages estimate derived in court. As argued by Møllgaard (2006), the public 
fines - which are imposed as part of public enforcement - could be interpreted as 
restitution to society for the deadweight losses caused by the cartel (see generally 
Leslie (2006) for an in-depth assessment of the relationship between antitrust 
damages and deadweight losses).  
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operated from August 1992 until June 1995. However, due to data limitations, 
only the losses to customers in the United States can be estimated in the following.   
Lysine is an essential amino acid which helps (via its influence on proteins) to 
speed the development of muscle tissue in humans and animals. 42  From the 
beginning of lysine production in the 1960s until the early 1980s, the world 
demand of lysine was basically produced by two firms - basically ‘acting as one’ - 
based in Japan. In 1980, a South Korean firm successfully entered the market on a 
smaller scale, followed by two additional newcomers in the early 1990’s: Archer-
Daniels-Midland (ADM) in the US and Cheil Sugar Co. in South Korea. The 
industry consequences of especially the large-scale entry of ADM were quite 
substantial as described by Connor ((2002), p. 10): “Within 18 months, ADM’s 
plant had expanded global production capacity by 25% above year-end 1990 
levels; by 1993, ADM’s single plant accounted for one-third of global capacity 
(780 million pounds). ADM’s strategic objective was to acquire a global market 
share equal to the industry leader, Ajinomoto. Ruthless price cutting by ADM and 
the sudden appearance of large excess capacity caused lysine prices to plunge 45% 
in the first 18 months of the Decatur plant’s operation”.   
Given the somewhat ‘destructive’ competition in the industry, the two Asian 
incumbents and ADM decided to form a ‘lysine trade association’ which was later 
joined by two other major lysine producers. The cartel investigations later 
assumed that ‘the association’ began its ‘operations’ in August 1992 and ceased to 
exist with the FBI raids in June 1995. During the cartel period, in early 1993, a 
brief price war occurred, basically because the cartel members couldn’t agree on 
global market shares. However, the dispute was somehow solved after a couple of 
months and the cartel was reinstated. Figure 6 below shows the lysine market 
prices for the United States and the European Union as well as the monthly 
production of ADM between July 1991 and May 1995.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
42  The section on the lysine cartel history follows Connor (2002: 8ff. and 2001: 6ff.). 
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Fig. 6. Average monthly lysine prices and ADM’s lysine production between July 1991 and 
June 1995 
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Source: The raw data stems from Connor (2002). 
Firstly, Figure 6 shows that market prices between the United States and the 
European Union are highly correlated - already in the pre-cartel period - indicating 
that both regions are in the same relevant (probably global) market. Secondly, the 
figure shows the substantial decline in market price prior to the cartel (at least 
partly caused by the substantial increase in ADM’s lysine production) as well as 
the substantial market price increases (up to a level of $0,98 per lb. from 
November 1992 to January 1993) following the cartel agreements. It shows as 
well the substantial price decline during the price war in early 1993 (down to a 
level of $0,62 in June 1993). However, after the price war, the cartel managed to 
raise (and stabilise) prices around $1.20 until the FBI cracked the cartel in June 
2005.   
The availability of data on production, prices and average total cost of ADM 
between July 1991 and June 1995 (i.e. the pre-cartel period as well as the whole 
cartel period) allows a simple ‘back of the envelope’ quantification of the 
additional profits ADM was able to collect due to the cartel agreement. The 
calculations are conducted in Table 8 below. 43 
                                                          
43  It is straightforward to see that the simple spreadsheet approach to quantify the excess 
profits of ADM followed in Table 32 below is very rough and would certainly not be 
considered as ‘acceptable’ in an actual damages trial. However, the aim here is not 
the exact calculation of damages but the derivation of a ballpark figure on the 
economic effects of a cartel agreement. Veljanovski (2007b: 11f.) identifies the 
  41
Columns (1) and (2) show the US (respective EU) market prices for lysine. 
Only the US price is used for the estimation. Column (3) shows the average total 
cost of lysine production of ADM as estimated by Connor (2002: 34). Column (4) 
in the calculation spreadsheet above adds an average return on investment of 6% 
of sales (see Connor (2002: 25) to the ATC to get a cost-based ‘but-for’ price 
which would have existed in the absence of the cartel. Column (5) shows the 
monthly lysine production of ADM. As detailed sales data is unavailable, the 
calculations have to assume that the whole monthly production is sold to the US 
market price in the United States in the same month. Columns (6), (7) and (8) 
calculate total costs, revenues and profit of ADM during the cartel as well as in the 
pre-cartel period. Columns (9) and (10) provide the numbers on revenues and 
profits ADM would have made if they faced the competitive ‘but-for’ price. 
Column (11) finally calculates the excess profit collected by ADM during the 
cartel. To get this value, the ‘but-for’ profit in column (10) simply has to be 
subtracted from the total profit estimate in column (8). The last column (12) 
provides an estimate of the deadweight loss caused by ADM’s participation in the 
cartel. Due to the unavailability of marginal cost data as well as (market) elasticity 
data, it is not possible to apply the general formula for the deadweight loss derived 
in section 2 above. Instead, a defensive general estimate of the deadweight loss of 
10% of the total overcharge is used, based on Connor and Helmers (2006: 21) who 
typically experience the deadweight loss between 10% and 30% of the total 
overcharge.  
                                                                                                                                     
following ten steps which would be necessary to quantify the aggregate overcharge 
damages in a damages trial:    
1. Determine or estimate the actual cartel prices for each period; 
2. Determine or estimate the quantity purchased by each claimant,  
3. Estimate the price for each period in the absence of the illegal cartel (known as the 
     ‘but-for’ price); 
4. Calculate the overcharge in each year by subtracting the estimated ‘but-for’ price 
  from the actual price for each year period; 
5. Estimate the proportion of the overcharge absorbed by upstream supplier; 
6. Estimate any downstream pass-on of the overcharge; 
7. Multiply the net annual overcharge absorbed by the claimant by quantity  
  purchased in each year to arrive at the annual net overcharge absorbed by the 
  claimant;  
8.  Apply the statutory simple pre-judgment interest rate; 
9.  Take account of other factors required by law, such as taxation; and  
10. Aggregate annual net losses to arrive at a compensable amount.  
  
Table 8. Estimating excess profits of ADM collected during the lysine cartel (1992-1995) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Month/ 
Year 
US 
Price 
EU 
Price 
ATC ATC 
+ 
ROI 
Production Total costs Total 
revenue 
Total profit But-for 
revenue 
But-for 
profit 
Excess 
Profit 
DWL 
Estimate 
 Cents 
/lb. 
Cents/ 
lb. 
Cents 
/lb. 
6% of 
sales 
lb. US Dollar US Dollar US Dollar US Dollar US Dollar US Dollar 10% of (11) 
Jul 91 101 101 144,80 150,86 4.345.749 6.292.645 4.389.206 -1.903.438 6.555.997 263.352 -2.166.790 -216.679 
Aug 91 108 110 146,90 153,38 4.091.849 6.010.926 4.419.197 -1.591.729 6.276.078 265.152 -1.856.881 -185.688 
Sep 91 111 124 136,70 143,36 4.438.936 6.068.026 4.927.219 -1.140.807 6.363.659 295.633 -1.436.440 -143.644 
Oct 91 112 124 112,80 119,52 6.351.685 7.164.701 7.113.887 -50.813 7.591.534 426.833 -477.647 -47.765 
Nov 91 107 127 99,40 105,82 7.125.868 7.083.113 7.624.679 541.566 7.540.594 457.481 84.085 8.409 
Dec 91 97 124 84,80 90,62 8.494.708 7.203.512 8.239.867 1.036.354 7.697.904 494.392 541.962 54.196 
Jan 92 91 114 82,10 87,56 8.238.434 6.763.754 7.496.975 733.221 7.213.573 449.818 283.402 28.340 
Feb 92 84 104 103,90 108,94 7.212.517 7.493.805 6.058.514 -1.435.291 7.857.316 363.511 -1.798.802 -179.880 
Mar 92 82 94 81,90 86,82 9.705.598 7.948.885 7.958.590 9.706 8.426.400 477.515 -467.810 -46.781 
Apr 92 80 95 75,10 79,90 10.817.071 8.123.620 8.653.657 530.036 8.642.840 519.219 10.817 1.082 
May 92 78 95 68,50 73,18 11.976.225 8.203.714 9.341.456 1.137.741 8.764.201 560.487 577.254 57.725 
Jun 92 69 90 68,30 72,44 13.562.577 9.263.240 9.358.178 94.938 9.824.731 561.491 -466.553 -46.655 
Jul 92 64 89 69,60 73,44 10.827.913 7.536.227 6.929.864 -606.363 7.952.019 415.792 -1.022.155 -102.215 
Aug 92 70 89 72,60 76,80 10.623.797 7.712.877 7.436.658 -276.219 8.159.076 446.199 -722.418 -72.242 
Sep 92 82 92 68,40 73,32 12.015.189 8.218.389 9.852.455 1.634.066 8.809.537 591.147 1.042.918 104.292 
Oct 92 92 101 62,20 67,72 14.684.324 9.133.650 13.509.578 4.375.929 9.944.224 810.575 3.565.354 356.535 
Nov 92 98 103 66,50 72,38 11.489.102 7.640.253 11.259.320 3.619.067 8.315.812 675.559 2.943.508 294.351 
Dec 92 98 103 64,80 70,68 13.688.529 8.870.167 13.414.758 4.544.592 9.675.052 804.886 3.739.706 373.971 
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Jan 93 98 115 71,00 76,88 10.831.684 7.690.496 10.615.050 2.924.555 8.327.399 636.903 2.287.652 228.765 
Feb 93 94 110 73,90 79,54 10.081.811 7.450.458 9.476.902 2.026.444 8.019.072 568.614 1.457.830 145.783 
Mar 93 89 107 81,40 86,74 9.642.060 7.848.637 8.581.433 732.797 8.363.523 514.886 217.911 21.791 
Apr 93 78 100 79,80 84,48 10.240.442 8.171.873 7.987.545 -184.328 8.651.125 479.253 -663.581 -66.358 
May 93 66 86 82,10 86,06 9.728.883 7.987.413 6.421.063 -1.566.350 8.372.677 385.264 -1.951.614 -195.161 
Jun 93 62 78 69,00 72,72 12.901.675 8.902.156 7.999.039 -903.117 9.382.098 479.942 -1.383.060 -138.306 
Jul 93 76 90 75,40 79,96 12.910.910 9.734.826 9.812.292 77.465 10.323.564 588.737 -511.272 -51.127 
Aug 93 88 95 66,10 71,38 16.120.703 10.655.785 14.186.219 3.530.434 11.506.958 851.173 2.679.261 267.926 
Sep 93 98 114 70,40 76,28 13.386.541 9.424.125 13.118.810 3.694.685 10.211.253 787.129 2.907.557 290.756 
Oct 93 108 125 74,10 80,58 13.391.778 9.923.307 14.463.120 4.539.813 10.791.095 867.787 3.672.026 367.203 
Nov 93 110 129 73,10 79,70 15.332.011 11.207.700 16.865.212 5.657.512 12.219.613 1.011.913 4.645.599 464.560 
Dec 93 113 133 74,20 80,98 15.754.486 11.689.829 17.802.569 6.112.741 12.757.983 1.068.154 5.044.586 504.459 
Jan 94 112 130 83,20 89,92 13.728.572 11.422.172 15.376.001 3.953.829 12.344.732 922.560 3.031.269 303.127 
Feb 94 111 132 76,30 82,96 13.991.012 10.675.142 15.530.023 4.854.881 11.606.944 931.801 3.923.080 392.308 
Mar 94 111 134 78,00 84,66 14.877.289 11.604.285 16.513.791 4.909.505 12.595.113 990.827 3.918.678 391.868 
Apr 94 111 130 71,90 78,56 16.046.847 11.537.683 17.812.000 6.274.317 12.606.403 1.068.720 5.205.597 520.560 
May 94 111 132 72,10 78,76 17.989.196 12.970.210 19.968.008 6.997.797 14.168.291 1.198.080 5.799.717 579.972 
Jun 94 111 132 89,40 96,06 14.046.932 12.557.957 15.592.095 3.034.137 13.493.483 935.526 2.098.612 209.861 
Jul 94 109 140 69,00 75,54 15.018.568 10.362.812 16.370.239 6.007.427 11.345.026 982.214 5.025.213 502.521 
Aug 94 111 137 69,70 76,36 14.754.791 10.284.089 16.377.818 6.093.729 11.266.758 982.669 5.111.060 511.106 
Sep 94 116 140 76,90 83,86 11.746.095 9.032.747 13.625.470 4.592.723 9.850.275 817.528 3.775.195 377.519 
Oct 94 120 140 68,50 75,70 15.089.369 10.336.218 18.107.243 7.771.025 11.422.652 1.086.435 6.684.590 668.459 
Nov 94 122 134 72,90 80,22 14.502.449 10.572.285 17.692.988 7.120.702 11.633.865 1.061.579 6.059.123 605.912 
Dec 94 122 130 77,60 84,92 14.199.351 11.018.696 17.323.208 6.304.512 12.058.089 1.039.392 5.265.119 526.512 
Jan 95 121 132 72,60 79,86 16.467.133 11.955.139 19.925.231 7.970.092 13.150.652 1.195.514 6.774.579 677.458 
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Feb 95 118 132 72,90 79,98 15.454.384 11.266.246 18.236.173 6.969.927 12.360.416 1.094.170 5.875.757 587.576 
Mar 95 112 136 75,30 82,02 16.206.394 12.203.415 18.151.161 5.947.747 13.292.484 1.089.070 4.858.677 485.868 
Apr 95 108 134 66,30 72,78 15.733.764 10.431.486 16.992.465 6.560.980 11.451.033 1.019.548 5.541.432 554.143 
May 95 98 126 74,40 80,28 15.004.248 11.163.161 14.704.163 3.541.003 12.045.410 882.250 2.658.753 265.875 
Jun 95 96 0 73,70 79,46 14.754.945 10.874.394 14.164.747 3.290.353 11.724.279 849.885 2.440.468 244.047 
  101 115 73,31 79,37 482.435.264 352.530.077 495.264.847 142.734.771 382.245.967 29.715.891 113.018.880 11.301.888 
Source: Own calculations based on data from Connor (2002); Connor’s ATC estimates and US market prices used for calculations;                  
Monthly production = Monthly sales assumed. 
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The results of the calculations in Table 8 show that the overall excess profit for 
ADM alone was about $113 million (or $3,229 million per month on average) 
during the cartel period from August 1992 to June 1995. The deadweight loss 
caused by ADM in the same period was about $11 million (or $0,322 million per 
month on average). The table further shows that the derived average ‘but-for’ 
price of $0,7937 is relatively close to the ‘but-for’ price of $0,8000 which was 
derived (by a different technique) during the trial (see Connor, 2006a: 18). The 
spreadsheet calculations further allow deriving the ‘incremental’ reduction in 
damages if the ‘but-for’ price is reduced by one cent. The result of $4,82 million 
damage reduction per cent generally shows the sensitivity of the damage 
calculations to the ‘but-for’ price mentioned above. From a practical perspective, 
it shows why it usually pays for the defendant to hire economic experts: They 
might be able to reduce the ‘but-for’ price by a few cents and so might save the 
defendant millions and millions of dollars in damages. 44  
From a conceptual perspective, it is important to mention that apart from the 
‘cost-based method’ applied above, several alternative methods to derive the ‘but-
for’ price exist (see generally van Dijk and Verboven (2005) as well as Clark et al 
(2004) for recent surveys). The ‘before-and-after’ method basically undertakes 
price comparisons before and after the infringement, while the so-called ’yardstick 
method’ analyses similar (ideally competitive) product markets to derive a ‘but-
for’ price for the cartelised market. One additional possibility is the application of 
economic models aiming at simulating competition and deriving an estimate for 
the ‘but-for’ price. For example, in a simple Cournot model with homogenous 
goods, the market price P can be estimated by using the following expression 
( mD  is the market demand elasticity, c are marginal cost and HHI is the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index):   
 HHIcP mD
m
D

 
 . (8) 
Equation (8) basically shows that the predicted ‘but-for’ price decreases with 
the number of firms in the market. In a competitive industry, the ‘but-for’ price 
would be equal to marginal costs. As reported by Connor (2000: 66f.), economists 
defending ADM actually used price estimates derived by a similar Cournot model 
to calculate (lower) damages. One basic problem which such estimates turned out 
to be its sensitivity to small changes in the underlying assumptions on market 
demand elasticity and marginal cost. This can be exemplified by plotting the 
above equation for different marginal costs of lysine (range from $0,40-$0,90 per 
lb.) as well as different absolute demand elasticities (range from 0,0-2,0; see 
Figure 7 below).  
                                                          
44  The exact values for different ‘but-for’ prices are as follows: $157.560.162 for a ‘but-
for’ price of $0,70, $133.438.399 for a ‘but-for’ price of $0,75, $109.316.636 for a 
‘but-for’ price of $0,80, $85.194.873 for a ‘but-for’ price of $0,85, $61.073.110 for a 
‘but-for’ price $0,90, $36.951.346 for a ‘but-for’ price of $0,95 and still $12.829.583 
for a ‘but-for’ price of $1,00.  
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Fig. 7. Predicted lysine ‘but-for’ prices applying a basic Cournot model with homogenous 
goods (HHI=3.500) 
 
As shown in Figure 7 (as well as in the corresponding Table 66 in Annex 6.7), 
the price predictions of the Cournot model can indeed be sensitive to slight 
changes of the marginal costs as well as the underlying demand elasticity. 
Especially in case of relatively inelastic demand (which was assumed to be the 
case for lysine), the predicted Cournot prices can even be negative or up to 800% 
higher than marginal cost. It is obvious that such model specifics make it difficult 
to use the respective results (successfully) in the courtroom - first of all because 
such results are easy to attack by the plaintiff.  
However, it shouldn’t be concealed that economics provide much more 
sophisticated methods to simulate ‘but-for’ prices. Given a sufficient data basis, it 
would be possible to conduct a simulation analysis which combines a demand 
model, a firm model as well as a model of competitive interaction to receive 
‘simulated’ market outcomes for different scenarios. De Roos (2006), for instance, 
construct and applies such a more sophisticated collusion model in order to 
understand the lysine market and to derive ‘meaningful’ ‘but-for’ prices.  
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the criminal lysine price fixing conspiracy 
trials led to five corporate fines and seven personal fines. The US corporate fines 
add up to $92,5 million, compared to $97,9 million in the EU and $11,5 million in 
Canada. In 1999, three persons where sentenced to a total of 99 months in prison 
(with a maximum per individual of 36 months). The private antitrust suits ended 
with agreements that the cartel members pay damages of (in sum) about $85 
million (only in the United States) which was roughly the loss of the lysine buyers 
in the United States. US antitrust law would have allowed up to treble damages. 
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6.2  Estimating the potential welfare effects of a merger - Evidence from the 
Nuon-Reliant case in the Netherlands 
 
Merger enforcement is another area which is believed to contribute substantially 
to the overall benefits of antitrust enforcement - basically by banning 
anticompetitive mergers which likely would have resulted in either an increase in 
market power and therefore would have caused higher prices (the so-called 
unilateral effects) and/or a market environment which would have been more 
favourable to collusion and - through this channel - would have caused higher 
prices (the so-called coordinated effects). In the following, evidence from the 
Nuon-Reliant case in the Dutch electricity market is analysed with respect to its 
(hypothetical) contribution to the benefits of antitrust enforcement in the 
Netherlands.  
Nuon is a Dutch energy utility which operates - amongst other activities - in the 
electricity wholesale and retail markets in the Netherlands. At the beginning of 
2003, it also owned some generation capacity (about 900 MW decentralised 
capacity) and had a long-term contract (about 800 MW) with an independent 
Intergen power plant. In 2003, Reliant Energy Europe (‘Reliant’), one of the major 
electricity generators in the Netherlands (about 3.500 MW capacity), planned to 
withdraw its activities in the Netherlands and Nuon saw the acquisition 45  of 
Reliant’s assets as an opportunity to promote its plans to further vertically 
integrate on the upstream (generation) level. The general market structure of the 
Dutch electricity market in 2003 is depicted in Figure 8 below. 
As shown in Figure 8, on the upstream level, the producers of electricity (in the 
Netherlands as well as in the neighbouring countries) can basically use two 
different marketplaces to trade their product. The largest part of the expected 
demand is traded via long- and medium term contracts (the so-called ‘over the 
counter’ contracts) from several years to months prior to supply. Short-term 
contracts come into play when actual demand can be estimated more precisely. 
These contracts are then traded at the Amsterdam Power Exchange (APX) - the 
Dutch spot market for electricity. Traders generally buy and sell electricity aiming 
at using price differences to make a profit. On the downstream level, vertically 
integrated retailers (i.e. firms with own generation capacity) as well as 
independent retailers supply business customers as well as households with 
electricity. Large customers tend to secure their electricity needs by signing long-
term contracts directly with the producers.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
45  Although Nuon-Reliant is de-facto an acquisition, it is referred to as a ‘merger’ in the 
following. This procedure is in line with antitrust literature which typically does not 
use constructs such as ‘acquisition control’ or ‘merger and acquisition control’.   
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Fig. 8. The Dutch electricity market in 2003 
 
Source: inspired by a comparable Figure in NMa (2006: 19). 
On 2nd April 2003 Nuon notified to the Dutch Competition Authority (NMa) 
that it wishes to acquire the Dutch electricity generation assets of Reliant. The 
NMa conducted an in-depth investigation of the case and came to the conclusion 
that the combination of the two firms’ generation assets would create or strengthen 
a dominant position in the electricity generation and wholesale markets in the 
Netherlands. It therefore only cleared the merger (after several negotiations) 
subject to the remedy that Nuon has to undertake a series of virtual power plant 
auctions for 900 MW of capacity per year over a period of five years (see NMa 
decision, Case 2286 Nuon/Reliant Energy Europe, 8 December 2003). The other 
major players in the Dutch market - Essent (about 4.300 MW generation capacity) 
and Electrabel (about 4.000 MW generation capacity) - are not allowed to 
participate in these auctions. Although Nuon started the required auctions by the 
end of 2004, it also appealed the NMa’s decision at the District Court of 
Rotterdam. The court undertook a detailed review of the economic analysis of the 
NMa and annulled the decision of the NMa in June 2005 (Court of Rotterdam, 
Nuon vs. NMa, LJN: AT6440, 31 May 2005). The economic analysis as well as 
the critics of the court is outlined in the following. 
The investigation of the NMa was based on a relevant market as that for 
generation and wholesale supply of electricity. For generation, the pre-merger 
HHI was estimated to 1.754 and the post-merger HHI to 1.974 (see Oxera, 2004: 
19) - a range in which competitive concerns are possible. In terms of market 
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shares, the merger would have led to a combined share between 20 and 30 percent, 
similar to that of the other major players in the market (Essent and Electrabel). 
Given these structural characteristics, the NMa basically argued that the proposed 
acquisition would create or strengthen a dominant position because of increased 
incentives of ‘generators at the margin’ to behave strategically in peak-times and 
therefore to cause higher post-merger prices. 46 In order to underpin this argument, 
the authority appointed two consultancies to build simulation models of the Dutch 
electricity market which allow studying how the market would likely operate 
before and after the merger. The first model was designed and applied by the 
Energieonderzoek Centrum Nederland (ECN) while the second stem from the UK-
based economic consultancy Frontier Economics (FE).  
The ECN model ‘COMPETES’ is a Cournot model that contains information 
on marginal costs about production units as well as the electricity network in 
Benelux, Germany and France. Following the description of van Damme (2005: 
163), the model is conceptually based on a linear demand curve and distinguishes 
12 different demand curves for three different seasons (summer, winter, 
fall/spring) and for each of these super-peak, peak, shoulder and off-peak periods. 
For each of these periods, one point on the demand curve is determined from 
historical data while at that point an elasticity of -0,2 (Scenario 1) or -0,1 
(Scenario 2) is assumed. Information on marginal costs and demand allows 
computing the Nash equilibria of the Cournot game pre-merger and post-merger. 
The SPARK model applied by Frontier Economics determines, inter alia, the 
Nash equilibrium bidding strategies for all generators under ‘realistic’ market 
conditions including, for example, generator operating characteristics, 
transmission losses and constraints or demand fluctuations (see Steinke et al. 
(2005: 5ff.) as well as Frontier Economics (2000) for the following description as 
well as a simple example). The model can be operated to find the least cost 
                                                          
46  As explained in more detail in Oxera (2004b: 18f.), the scope of market power for a 
particular electricity generator depends on its position in the merit order of 
generators. At the lower end of the merit order, generators - such as nuclear power or 
coal-fired plants - are located with low marginal cost but also a low flexibility to 
adjust production following demand changes. These plants provide the base load. If 
demand increases (often from one minute to the other), generators with higher 
marginal cost but also a higher flexibility - such as gas- or oil-fired plants - will start 
producing electricity. Generators with very high marginal costs only operate in peak-
demand periods. The last generator which is needed to meet existing demand sets the 
market price for electricity. This opens possibilities for the owners of generators to 
behave strategically aiming at increasing the market price in peak hours (under the 
assumption that import capacity is constrained and already fully utilised at peak 
demand). As a consequence, the market-power effects of a merger between two base-
load generators can be substantially lower than a merger between two peak-load 
generators even if the increase in the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for the former 
merger would be substantially larger. In other words, the HHI alone does not provide 
a full picture of the competitive forces and the likelihood of price increases due to a 
merger in the electricity industry (see Stoft (2002: 357ff.) and NMa (2006) for 
detailed descriptions).  
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operation of the system (i.e. the economic dispatch), or it can be operated to find 
the most profitable (=sustainable) operation of the market (that is the equilibrium 
price). In this type of model the optimal bid will change, as it does in a real 
market, according to the changing market conditions - for example, operation of 
transmission constraints, plant failures or new investments. Many commentators 
such as NERA (2005) or van Damme (2005: 163) connect the Frontier model to 
the ‘supply function equilibrium’ approach formulated by Klemperer and Meyer 
(1989) as a third way to model competitive interaction in electricity markets next 
to Cournot and Bertrand models. However, FE itself did not explain which model 
of competitive interaction comes closest to their simulation approach.  
Based on their respective simulation approaches, ECN and FE both estimated 
the pre-merger price level and compared it with the post-merger price level. The 
ECN model shows a merger-induced price increase of 5,9% for an underlying 
demand elasticity of -0,2 and about 10,4% for an underlying demand elasticity of -
0,1. Given the pre-merger quantity (approximated by the Dutch electricity 
production in 2001 (around 90.000 MWh) plus the import-export difference in 
2001 (around +17.000 MWh)), it is straightforward to derive the post-merger 
quantity via the usual elasticity expression. It is then possible to estimate the 
redistribution effect (per year) from consumers to producers as well as the 
deadweight loss (per year) caused by the proposed acquisition. The results are 
presented in Table 9 below. 
Table 9. Welfare effects of the attempted prohibition of the merger between Nuon and 
Reliant in the Netherlands 
 
ECN 
Simulation 
Model I 
ECN 
Simulation 
Model II 
FE Simulation 
Model I 
FE Simulation  
Model II 
 
Price increase 
of 5,9% 
Price increase 
of 10,4% 
Price increase 
of 13,3% 
Price increase 
of 13,3% 
Pre-merger price  
(€/MWh) 44,9 44,9 43,7 43,7 
Post-merger price 
(€/MWh) 47,5 49,6 49,5 49,5 
Demand elasticity -0,2 -0,1 -0,2 -0,1 
Pre-merger quantity  
(MWh) 107.000.000 107.000.000 107.000.000 107.000.000 
Post-merger quantity  
(MWh) 105.737.400 105.887.200 104.160.220 105.580.110 
Redistribution effect 
(€/year) 280.108.946 494.450.869 604.024.074 612.258.002 
Redistribution effect 
(% of sales) 5,57 9,42 11,72 11,72 
Deadweight loss  
(€/year) 1.672.377 2.598.165 8.233.928 4.116.964 
Deadweight loss 
(% of redistr.) 0,60 0,53 1,36 0,67 
Source: Own calculations based on Oxera (2004b), p. 21 
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As Table 9 shows, the four simulation results lead to relatively different 
redistribution effects as well as deadweight losses. However, the redistribution 
effect appears to be substantial ‘across the board’ (between 5,57% and 11,72% of 
post-merger sales) while the deadweight losses are - due to the low demand 
elasticity - relatively small (between 0,60% and 1,36% of the redistribution 
effect). Aside from the fact that the quantitative results differ quite substantially, 
their ‘signs’ are identical for all four models. In other words, all four models 
predict substantial price increases following an acquisition of Reliant by Nuon. 
However, it has to be kept in mind that the whole analysis is static and therefore 
does not consider potentially important dynamic effects of merger enforcement on 
innovation intensity and productive efficiency in the Dutch electricity market.     
As already seen in the cartel case study above, simulation results tend to be 
quite sensitive to small changes in parameters such as demand elasticities or - as 
here - the underlying price increase that is believed to be caused by the merger. 47 
In order to see the sensitivity of the results in this case, Figure 9 shows different 
deadweight loss- as well as redistribution effect-ranges dependent on a range of 
the assumed % increase in price due to the merger and a range of the assumed 
market demand elasticity.  
In Figure 9, (1) marks the value of ECN’s simulation result I, (2) the value of 
ECN’s simulation result II, (3) marks the value of Frontier Economics’ simulation 
result I and (4) the value of Frontier Economics’ simulation result II. In general, 
the figure shows that the quantitative results are again quite sensitive to small 
parameter changes. These specifics were one cornerstone in the (successful) 
attempt of Nuon to convince the Court of Amsterdam that the simulations of ECN 
and FE are not sufficient to prove anticompetitive effects as a consequence of the 
merger (following Dutch competition law).   
In the evaluation of the two models, several large economic consultancies were 
involved. Oxera was hired for an independent external evaluation of the models. 
NERA and RBB Economics supported Nuon (see van Bergeijk (2005), Oxera 
(2004), NERA (2005) and RBB Economics (2005) for their respective views of 
the case). As discussed in van Damme (2005: 163f.), the basic arguments against 
the significance of the merger simulations (and in particular the FE model) were 
that the pre-merger price distribution is not in line with the one actually observed, 
inelastic demand is unrealistic, demand side bidding is neglected, the Nash 
equilibria are not sustainable (NERA, 2005), the multiple equilibria problem is 
(inappropriately) dealt with by the construction of price ranges and averages, no 
empirical evidence is given that strategic behaviour is a problem in the Dutch 
market pre-merger (see RBB Economics, 2005), the modelling of the 
interconnector is inappropriate, the specification of the strategy space is arbitrary 
and may influence the results, and the model assumes complete information. As 
mentioned above, the Court of Rotterdam decided that the NMa had not provided 
sufficient evidence to support its case. The NMa has appealed the judgement.  
 
                                                          
47  See Froeb et al. (2004) for a general discussion of advantages and shortfalls of merger 
simulations.  
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Fig. 9. Different estimates of the deadweight loss and surplus redistribution per year in the 
Netherlands due to the proposed Nuon-Reliant merger 
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